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 This thesis deals with the representation of paideia in Lucian, which I approach as a 
focused snapshot of a broad and complex topic. Education, culture, and identity are highly 
charged terms in any context, but certainly in the Greek literary period that is known to modern 
scholars as the Second Sophistic. My aim is to offer an interpretation of a selection of Lucian’s 
works based on a close reading that is informed by the historical context of the Second Sophistic.  
 I will begin with a brief explanation of the terms which underlie my inquiry. The Greek 
word paideia (παιδεία) translates most simply as “education,” the process by which a child 
(pais) is brought up and trained. For the ancient Greeks, however, paideia came to imply not just 
education in general, but the accumulation of a certain body of knowledge and its associated 
values embedded within Greek culture. By the time in which Lucian is writing, paideia also has 
the meaning of “culture,” the quality or state of learnedness that is derived from education.1 We 
can therefore also understand paideia as part of “culture” in a different sense, that is, as part of 
what ancient Greek-speaking peoples could use to define what it meant to be Greek.  
 These sound like sweeping generalizations, but they have particular relevance for the 
time on which I have chosen to focus. The “Second Sophistic” is a modern description used for 
the period of Imperial Greek literature from approximately 50 to 250 CE. The phrase was 
originally coined by Flavius Philostratus in his biographical collection, Lives of the Sophists (c. 
230 CE), to distinguish between two styles of Greek oratory, an older, “first sophistic,” and a 
“second sophistic,” founded by Aeschines in the fourth century BCE (Phil. 481). Most of the 
orators of this second style described by Philostratus come from the Roman period, and hence 
modern scholarship has appropriated the term for the Greek sophists of the early to mid Roman 
Empire in particular. More recently, it has come to refer loosely to Greek imperial literature 
                                                 
1
 Marrou (1956) observes that paideia is translated by some Latin authors as humanitas.  
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regardless of its connection to rhetoric. As Tim Whitmarsh has noted, the choice of the term 
“Second Sophistic” has important ramifications for how this period and the literature included in 
it are conceptualized. For one, it emphasizes the “secondness” of this literature, its awareness of 
coming later in a tradition and of being in a constant relationship with previous texts.
2
 This 
distinction is both modern and ancient: not only has there been a tendency in recent times to read 
the literature of the Second Sophistic in comparison with earlier and better studied Greek 
literature, especially the classical age of the fourth and fifth centuries BCE, but the writers of the 
Second Sophistic were always consciously looking backward to those earlier examples. In 
addition, the word “sophistic” is a reminder of the continued importance of rhetoric in Greek 
intellectual culture of this time period.
 3
 Although “Second Sophistic” as it is typically used now 
includes a range of literary genres, orators and the performance of oratory have a prominent role 
in the Second Sophistic that is important for our understanding of it.  
 Paideia is a crucial element for both halves of the “Second Sophistic.” The referential or 
derivative nature of its literature results from both a continuing education tradition in the Greek-
speaking world and the historical circumstances in which Greeks of this period were living. By 
the middle of the first century, the Greeks had had a cultural presence in the eastern 
Mediterranean for hundreds of years, both in the city-states of the Greek mainland and in other 
regions colonized by them or where Hellenizing influences had been spread by the conquest of 
Alexander the Great. However, all of this region was now firmly under the control of the Roman 
Empire, which meant that not only did Greek cities lack the political autonomy they had enjoyed 
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 Note on the word “sophist”. I use a number of terms to talk about public speaking and those who practiced it, 
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denoting the theoretical and performance aspects of public speaking, but it was not clear that there was any hard and 
fast distinction in antiquity, and I use these terms interchangeably. The word “sophist” often has a negative 
connotation in ancient times; this may have shifted by the Second Sophistic, although there is a still a connection 
between “sophist” and epideictic oratory. See Gunderson 2009 for further discussion of these terms.  
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in the classical period, but they also had to contend with the domination of a powerful non-Greek 
entity. It is perhaps not surprising that this period is marked by a tendency to focus on the past, 
politically independent era of the Greek world to the exclusion of the present. Bowie has noted 
the prevalence of archaizing among both orators and historians, who consistently ignore or skim 
over events after 323 BCE. A preference for classically-influenced themes and models, as well as 
the use of classical Attic for literary texts, create a picture of a society whose intellectuals, 
despite whatever political connections they may have had in the Roman system, were determined 
to assert their Greek identity.
4
 
 It is more useful to see this backward-looking tendency not as a sudden shift but as a 
logical procession of pre-existing ideas and practices of paideia in the Greek-speaking world. 
From Hellenistic times traditional education for elite classes had emphasized the reading of a 
canonical selection of texts, mainly from the classical period, and education in rhetoric, 
particularly, was based upon the imitation of specific models and set forms drawn from classical 
examples.
5
 This not only produced orators who naturally chose subjects from classical texts, it 
also reinforced a mindset that privileged an authoritative original source and promoted emulation 
of it as the highest form of learning. Added to this was a tradition, which had emerged in the first 
century BCE, of using the Attic dialect of classical Athens as the language of literature and elite 
intellectual communication, even though commonly spoken forms of Greek had changed 
considerably since the fourth century BCE even among the upper classes.
6
 Thus paideia already 
consisted of a package of practices and values with both an archaizing inclination and a 
characteristically “Greek” flavor.  
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 Nevertheless, it is clear that these aspects of paideia had particular significance for 
writers and intellectuals of the Second Sophistic, whom we might more accurately refer to as 
pepaideumenoi (singular pepaideumenos), those who have acquired paideia. Much insightful 
work has been done to explore the ways in which Greeks in the Second Sophistic negotiated their 
identities and literary voices vis-à-vis Roman domination. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
do justice to most of this, but I am taking a number of theoretical assumptions and influences 
from this scholarship. First, I follow especially Whitmarsh and Goldhill in seeing labels such as 
“Greek” and “Roman” not as outward expressions of innate qualities, but as identities that were 
constantly being constructed and defined by the individuals and groups that used them, through 
multiple means including literature. While distinct ethnic identities certainly existed, it is 
important to remember that in an empire where travel and exchange had become increasingly 
common, shifting linguistic and cultural boundaries overlapped to create complex identities that 
might be expressed differently by different individuals. Paideia works with that in the sense that 
it is both an expression of an established cultural identity (what it means to be Greek), and a 
means of constructing it (one becomes truly Greek by acquiring paideia). In that way paideia 
transcends, or has the potential to transcend, ethnic lines; and indeed several important figures of 
the Second Sophistic, including Lucian, were not ethnically Greek, but were able to participate in 
the Greek intellectual world through their paideia.  
 Recent scholarship has also illuminated something else that is significant for my inquiry, 
which is that paideia mediated not only cultural identity but social class and status. Education 
was a business of the elite, and so also one of the ways in which they displayed their status. 
Swain has addressed the political dimension of the practice of Atticism, which set the 
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pepaideumenoi linguistically apart and above the rest of the population.
7
 Gleason and Whitmarsh 
more fully explore how paideia is used to construct the elite Greek-speaking (male) subject.
8
 
Because paideia was the province of a select few, displaying that one has paideia is a way of 
claiming elite status as well as a cultural connection to the revered past. Display is an important 
concept here which also brings in the emphasis on oratory, for the public performance of oratory 
was the primary arena for individuals to showcase their paideia. Public speeches had long been 
an important part of Greek civic life, but the Second Sophistic saw a proliferation of professional 
orators who travelled throughout the empire performing before audiences for money, often in 
competition with other orators.
9
 Their services might also be used in a civic context, and oratory 
was necessary for law courts, although this was often considered separate from the realm of 
professional sophists. In these performances the prominence fell on epideictic rhetoric, or 
speeches on set themes that served to display the eloquence of the speaker.  
 The significance of this kind of performance cannot be overstated, although it is difficult 
for modern readers to fully grasp this when the words what would have been declaimed aloud 
come to us on a page, disconnected from the individual speakers who would have performed 
them. As Gleason has noted, although paideia was acquired primarily through mastery of 
literacy, it had to be displayed orally; furthermore, the status of pepaideumenos, once achieved, 
was not something that could be taken for granted, but had to be constantly asserted and proven 
in public and face-to-face interactions.
10
 What this means is that paideia, on the one hand, 
constitutes a package of knowledge and skills that is generally common to all who have it. A 
declaimer draws from this knowledge to build speeches (or a writer to compose literary texts), 
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and the pepaideumenoi in his audience will be able to notice a clever literary reference or judge 
the fluency of his Attic Greek. At the same time, paideia is constantly being constructed and 
enacted by those who practice it in this display of performance, as they rework traditional themes 
and compete with other pepaideumenoi for prowess and renown.  
On a practical level, what might education in the Second Sophistic actually involve? 
First, the study of literature: the “classical canon” of paideia seems to have exalted Homer 
especially, but textual references suggest that many other authors were read, including lyric poets 
such as Sappho and Pindar, Euripides, Sophocles, Aeschylus, Menander, Aristophanes, 
Demosthenes, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Herodotus.
11
 Quotations, references, and echoes from 
many of these authors appear in Lucian, who was clearly widely read. For rhetorical training, 
students would practice preliminary exercises called progymnasmata that were intended to equip 
them with a set of skills and devices that would be useful in the composition of a speech. In 
progymnasmata all potential aspects of a speech were broken down systematically for the 
student to practice in turn: among other things, an aspiring orator would learn how to tell a 
simple story multiple ways, to compose standard formulas of praise and blame, and argue for or 
against a simple theoretical proposition. The examples on which they practiced would typically 
come from historical or mythological stories that were widely known and re-used. For example, 
a second-century handbook on rhetoric by Hermogenes takes the legend of Medea through a 
series of narrative variations; common questions for debate might also include episodes from the 
Trojan War or historical events from the history of Athens. When it came time for an orator to 
compose a speech, he would have standard list of examples to draw from, which could easily be 
fitted into one of the customary forms. Professional sophists were expected to improvise 
speeches using these tools; in competitions, often in response to suggestion from the audience. 
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What they said might be written down afterwards or possibly beforehand and memorized, but 
never read in performance. In this aspect of rhetoric there is a certain amount of tension between 
tradition and innovation. All orators might use the same formulas, but a true test of their skill 




 Paideia in the Second Sophistic thus presents an array of complex issues to tackle. More 
than simply “education,” paideia in this period is a vehicle for both the performance and the 
construction of cultural identity and social status, processes which are enacted in the public 
sphere of oratory as well as in the writing of literature. It offers an articulation of what it means 
to be Greek in a Roman world, largely through an almost obsessively persistent connection with 
the past. As writers such as Whitmarsh and Goldhill have discussed, however, none of this is 
necessarily simple or straightforward; the literature of the Second Sophistic grapples with 
questions that the peculiar cultural position of Greeks in the Roman world provoked. Their focus 
on the glory days of Greece, for example, might bring the present closer to the past, but it also 
risked exposing the gap between past and present. An insistence on purity of language and a 
classics-based standard in elite education might create a unified culture, but it could also run up 
against the reality that the world in which they were living encompassed a hybrid mixture of 
cultures.  
 In the midst of this muddle comes Lucian of Samosata. Virtually nothing is known about 
Lucian outside of his works; the primary external evidence for his existence is an 
uncomplimentary entry in the tenth-century Suda (λ 683), and a brief mention in the writings of 
Galen which survive in Arabic. He is not mentioned in Philostratus’ Lives of the Sophists, which 
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includes many other figures from the Second Sophistic. Based on internal evidence from his 
texts, it has been suggested that Lucian was born between 115 and 125 CE, which would date his 
writings to the mid to late second century.
13
 He mentions in one text that his native city is 
Samosata, located on the west bank of the Euphrates in modern-day Syria. Lucian frequently 
refers to himself, or to a figure that may represent him, as “Syrian,” “Assyrian,” or “barbarian” 
(βάρβαρος), and a work sometimes attributed to him describes a temple to the Syrian goddess 
Atargatis in city of Hierapolis Bambyce.
14
 Exactly how “Syrian” Lucian really was is impossible 
to say. Samosata was the capital of the kingdom of Commagene, ruled by a mixed Iranian-Greek 
dynasty until its absorption into the Roman Empire in 72 CE. By Lucian’s time this region would 
have long been influenced by Greek culture, at least among the upper classes.  
However, as Swain points out, just across the river from Samosata was the Semitic 
kingdom of Osrhoene, which in the subsequent centuries would be the site of the rise of the 
Aramaic language and the Syriac Christian church in opposition to the prevailing imperial forms 
of language and religion.
15
 It is possible that Lucian’s first language was Aramaic, and that his 
ethnicity barred him from full inclusion into the society of Greek pepaideumenoi; he is certainly 
inclined to represent himself as a foreigner.  Whatever the exact details were, the crucial point is 
that Lucian originated from a place on the margins of the Greek-speaking world. His position in 
that world thus depends upon the learned acquisition of culture, on his paideia.  
This mysterious character thus makes for an intriguing object of investigation, as does his 
work, which is difficult to categorize. He has a large corpus, most of which might be described 
as satire: he makes fun of historians, courtesans, philosophers, even the gods. Some of it even 
uses fantastical elements, almost like an early precursor of science fiction. It is likely that Lucian 
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wrote primarily for a performance context; he has a particular fondness for prolaliai 
(introductions that orators might use to set up a longer speech, but which in Lucian often seem to 
stand alone) as well as comic dialogues.
16
 Like a proper pepaideumenos, he draws on a wide 
range of classical literary references, themes and subjects, delivered in pitch-perfect Attic Greek, 
although he reworks them in clever and subversive ways. This reworking is essential to what 
makes Lucian’s pieces comic, as Branham has shown.17 For the purpose of the present 
discussion, it is also central to understanding the ways in which Lucian represents paideia.  
Paideia is an interesting lens through which to explore Lucian because it encapsulates 
many of the complex issues of the Second Sophistic and the literary figure of Lucian that I have 
just summarized. Lucian lived and wrote in a world in which education had enormous cultural 
and social significance, and his primary, perhaps only, connection to that world was through his 
education and the display of its results. How he will then choose to represent paideia within his 
texts is therefore certainly not inconsequential, and Lucian seems well aware of this. Indeed, his 
works show an awareness of the process of composing and performing, as well as of his 
audience, his self-presentation, and social context in which his presentation would have been 
received. My analysis does not attempt to hypothesize specific historical references or 
connections from the text; rather, I focus on a close reading of three texts, Somnium, Rhetorum 
Praeceptor, and Bis Accusatus, that is informed by the historical and theoretical background 
referenced in this introduction.  
In the first chapter I discuss Somnium, a short piece in which the narrator describes a 
dream that led him to choose a career founded on paideia rather than training as a sculptor. The 
choice portrayed by the dream is personified by two female figures, Paideia and Sculpture, 
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between whom the narrator must decide, which invokes a well-established motif in Greek 
literature. Lucian subversively reworks this motif and other classical references to craft a piece 
that is both a satire of paideia and an exposition of it.  
My second chapter looks at Rhetorum Praeceptor, a satirical invective that uses an 
instructional guide for the education of a professional orator in order to lampoon the inept 
practice of oratory. In this chapter, I discuss how Lucian uses this satirical representation of a 
bad practice of oratory to raise problematic issues about rhetorical performance in general.  
Finally, my third chapter focuses on Bis Accusatus, a comic dialogue in which a host of 
improbable characters are brought to trial, including a figure called the “Syrian” who has 
meddled with practices related to paideia. This piece brings up many issues related to Lucian’s 
precarious position as a foreigner who is also a pepaideumenos, giving him the opportunity to 
defend his paideia under “trial.” This chapter postulates how Lucian manipulates the 
implications of his status and his unorthodox literary style so that they work to his advantage.  
 The narrow scope of this thesis cannot account for every facet of Lucian’s work and its 
relationship to paideia and the Second Sophistic. Nevertheless, even these three texts alone raise 
many intriguing questions, some of which I will attempt to address in the pages that follow. 
Lucian’s texts prompt his audience to reconsider the role of paideia as a connection between past 
and present, as well as its significance as a marker of status, and to wonder whether or not social 
mobility is possible through education. For all of these questions he offers no straightforward 







 I will begin my inquiry into the depiction of paideia in Lucian with a short work called 
Somnium (The Dream). In this piece, Lucian represents paideia, in his typical fashion, not just 
thematically but literally, as an embodied figure.  
 At the beginning of Somnium, the speaker tells us that when he was a young boy, just 
finished with the rudiments of education, his father considered what kind of career to train him 
for. The father decides that any further paideia would be too costly and time-consuming, and 
overly ambitious for someone of his family’s rank. Instead, the speaker is apprenticed to his 
uncle, a sculptor of statues (ἑρμογλύφος), with the hope that a youthful talent for sculpting 
figures out of the wax from his school tablets will give him an aptitude for this trade. On his first 
day, however, the speaker bungles his first strike on a block of stone and is beaten by his uncle. 
He runs home crying with pain and wounded pride, and that night he has a strange dream. In this 
dream, two women come to him, each one trying to persuade him to follow her path: squalid, 
mannish Hermogluphike Techne – a personification of the sculptor’s craft he has just begun to 
learn – and elegant, composed Paideia, an embodiment of the education he had rejected. Each 
one gives a speech describing the benefits she has to offer him. The speaker quickly chooses 
Paideia, and rides away with her in a flying chariot, rising to the glorious heights of fame. 
At first glance, the Somnium appears to be simply a story of the speaker’s career, and 
many have read it like this as a reference for Lucian’s own life. Leaving aside biographical 
speculations, the piece still functions as an exposition of the speaker’s paideia, literally because 
it explains how he acquired it, but also implicitly through Lucian’s use of certain motifs and 
references to classical literature. The speaker introduces the account of his dream with a direct 
quotation from Book Two of the Iliad, when Agamemnon is recounting a dream: θεῖός μοι 
13 
 
ἐνύπνιον ἦλθεν ὄνειρος ἀμβροσίην διὰ νύκτα (a god-sent dream came to me as a vision in 
sleep through the ambrosial night) (5) (cf. Iliad II.56-7). By opening with this quotation, he 
demonstrates familiarity with Homer, and more importantly, he promotes his story as coming 
from a tradition where inspiration from a dream has a legitimate precedent. With regard to the 
dream itself, the choice between two allegorical figures which represent contrasting ideas recalls 
Prodicus’ fable of the choice of Heracles, as told by Socrates in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (Xen. 
Mem. 2.1.21-34). This reference again serves both to demonstrate the speaker’s paideia and to 
give his story a respectable precedent. It may be an exaggeration to say that the speaker is 
implying a link between himself and the hero Heracles, but by choosing to tell his story with that 
motif, he prompts his audience to consider the possibility. The speaker’s implied claim to 
illustrious status extends further, because his choosing between Paideia and Sculpture associates 
him with Socrates, who was said to have abandoned a career as a sculptor when he took up 
philosophy. Paideia even mentions this in her speech:  
ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῇ Ἑρμογλυφικῇ ταύτῃ τραφείς, ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα 
συνῆκεν τοῦ κρείττονος καὶ δραπετεύσας παρ᾽ αὐτῆς ηὐτομόλησεν ὡς ἐμέ, 
ἀκούεις ὡς παρὰ πάντων ᾁδεται  
Socrates himself was reared by that Sculpture, but he quickly perceived who was 




An educated audience would notice these references, and so by including them, Lucian 
establishes a context for his speaker and the speaker’s audience in terms of their relation to 
paideia. The speaker demonstrates that he is an educated person who is familiar with classical 
texts and can incorporate them in his own story; accordingly, he expects his audience to be 
educated enough to spot his references.  
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However, it quickly becomes clear that Lucian is manipulating the conventions with 
which he purported to start. The more the speaker tries to proclaim his paideia, the more he 
undermines the account of his career and claim to paideia, and even raises doubts about the 
nature of paideia itself. But once he has brought us to that point of doubting him, we also see 
that he is a master of his paideia all along, and has been using it to construct this manipulation.  
As Deborah Gera has noted, many later writers also draw on the choice of Heracles, 
either retelling the fable or reworking it with a different pair of figures, as Lucian does.
19
 In her 
study of a range of these examples, however, Gera finds that Lucian’s approach to the “choice” 
allegory has some unusual twists, particularly in the way he depicts the figures themselves. In 
Xenophon’s version, Heracles encounters two women at a crossroads, Arete (Virtue) and Kakia 
(Vice), who each try to persuade him to follow their path. Both Vice and Virtue are attractive, 
but Virtue is modest and understated, while Vice attempts to be seductive with artificial 
adornment. Most other writers follow this pattern by making the positive figure modest or even 
unattractive, and the negative figure artificially beautiful in a way that suggests a false 
appearance.
20 
This, as Gera points out, makes sense for the moral dimension of the fable: if the 
negative figure did not at least appear to be an appealing choice, there would be nothing at stake 
in making the right decision.
21
 Yet Lucian’s Techne is unmistakably ugly, and his choice to go 
with Paideia is evidently based on her more attractive appearance. He has disrupted the 
conventions on which this motif should rest if it intends to have a moralizing message. However 
simple the story told in Somnium may seem, then, it is not meant to be a fable in the same way.  
 If we do not read the speaker’s choice between Techne and Paideia as a simple one 
between the “virtuous” way and the “wicked” way, what exactly is at stake in his decision? What 
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are we to make of this as a defense of his paideia? I propose that there are two persistent themes 
in the text that are important for understanding how Lucian has reworked the choice allegory, 
and how he uses it to comment on paideia. The first is appearance and presentation. The 
Somnium is fixated on the physical appearance, dress, and adornment of its characters, and also 
on the acts of showing, seeing, and being seen. The second, closely linked to this, is a distinction 
between speech and physical deeds and works created (or rather, sculpted) by the hands.  
 The description that introduces the figure of Tekhne resembles that of a laborer who has 
just come from a hard day’s toil in her shop: her appearance is squalid (αὐχμηρὰ), her hands are 
calloused (τὼ χεῖρε τύλων ἀνάπλεως), her clothes are girded up for work (διεζωσμένη τὴν 
ἐσθῆτα), and she is covered in chalk (τιτάνου καταγέμουσα) (6). She is, in effect, the sort of 
person who gives little of her attention to her physical appearance, because all of it is directed 
toward her craft. Tekhne herself seems concerned that her poor appearance may count against 
her, for she urges the speaker not to take heed of it: μὴ μυσαχθῇς δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τὸ εὐτελὲς 
μηδὲ τῆς ἐσθῆτος τὸ πιναρὸν (Do not loath the meanness of my appearance nor the squalor of 
my clothes) (8). By trying to excuse her own appearance, she acknowledges that looks will count 
for something in this choice, and reinforces the implication of a workman’s dusty appearance as 
negative.  
 The first description of Paideia is the opposite of Tekhne’s disarray: she is fair of face 
(εὐπρόσωπος), comely in form (τὸ σχῆμα εὐπρεπὴς), and has neatly-arranged clothing 
(κόσμιος τὴν ἀναβολήν) (6). Later, she indicates the she is wearing “illustrious” finery (πάνυ 
δὲ λαμπρὰν ἐφόρει) (11). From the very beginning the contrast between the two possible 
choices is constructed on the basis of appearance, and we are meant to see Paideia’s attractive, 
orderly figure as the more positive of the two. But this fixation on appearance continues to show 
16 
 
up even in unexpected places. In Paideia’s speech, she describes the virtues and skills she will 
offer the speaker with particular reference to appearance. By exposing him to the words and 
deeds of great men, Paideia says that she will ornament his soul with many good decorations 
(τὴν ψυχήν … κατακοσμήσω πολλοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς κοσμήμασι) (10). She lists all the attributes 
which the wise and noble seek – intelligence, piety, love of beauty, and so forth – but she does 
not say, as one might expect, that his soul will possess these virtues, but that it will be adorned 
by them (κατακοσμήσω), and lest there be any mistaking the choice of the word, she emphasizes 
again that these are ornaments or decorations (κοσμήμασι). It is as though the soul were a figure 
that needed to be clothed, and that it was first and foremost necessary that this arraignment be 
composed of the most seemly parts. The process of becoming a pepaideumenos has blurred with 
the process of arranging one’s physical appearance.  
 This connection becomes more explicit as Paideia’s speech continues. She promises the 
speaker that if he follows her he will wear fine clothes like hers, interrupting her speech briefly 
to point them out: ‘ἐσθῆτα μὲν τοιαύτην ἀμπεχόμενος,’ δείξασα τὴν ἑαυτῆς (“having this sort 
of clothing,” indicating her own) (11). When the speaker does choose Paideia, she takes him in a 
chariot ride across the sky to show him his future as a pepaideumenos. At the end of this, the boy 
finds that he is indeed wearing fine clothes unlike those he had worn before, a garment with a 
purple border, and he shows these off with pride to his father and others at home  
οὐκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἐσθῆτα ἐκείνην ἐνδεδυκότα ἣν εἶχον ἀφιπτάμενος, ἀλλά μοι 
ἐδόκουν εὐπάρυφός τις ἐπανήκειν, καταλαβοῦσα οὖν καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἑστῶτα 
καὶ περιμένοντα ἐδείκνυεν αὐτῷ ἐκείνη τὴν ἐσθῆτα κἀμέ 
[She brought me back] no longer wearing that same clothing which I had had when I 
flew off, but rather it seemed to me that some purple-bordered garment returned 
[with me], and finding my father standing and waiting she showed him the clothing 
and me (16). 
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His transformation by paideia is symbolized through his change of clothes, which everyone can 
see and admire. It is, indeed, the only thing that seems to have changed, for no mention is made 
of what he has learned, as if all one really had to do to become educated was to put on a fancy 
purple robe. Meanwhile, grubby Tekhne, rejected for her prettier rival, gnashes her teeth in fury, 
but presently turns inexplicably to stone. She has passed into the medium of her work, and the 
speaker has passed, with Paideia, into higher realms.  
 This link between paideia and adornment shows how Lucian is further confusing the 
poles upon which his choice is supposed to depend. There is an ugly Tekhne whose negative 
portrayal marks her as the “wrong” choice, and an attractive Paideia who is then supposed to be 
the “right” choice. However, by blatantly associated Paideia with clothing and ornamentation, he 
implies that both her appeal to the speaker and the transformation she offers are purely cosmetic, 
something that seems good on the outside but is empty on the inside, rather more like Prodicus’ 
superficially attractive Vice. This throws the nature of his choice into doubt: is Paideia the 
“good” one or the “bad” one? As Gera observed through her analysis of similar stories, Lucian 
presentation of the two figures makes this distinction ambiguous. Now we may also begin to 
doubt the nature of paideia in general. Is he implying that paideia is primarily a matter of what a 
person wears, and not the learning they have acquired, as one would naturally expect? Do the 
clothes, then, make the man?  
 Even beyond physical adornment, Somnium is preoccupied with the act of presentation, 
of how one is viewed by others. Throughout the text, words of showing and displaying 
(φαίνομαι, δείκνυμι) are significant in constructing identity. Even before the speaker has his 
dream, his only concern as he prepares to learn sculpture is how his friends will be impressed: εἰ 
φαινοίμην θεοὺς τε γλύφων καὶ ἀγαλμάτια μικρά τινα κατασκευάζων ἐμαυτῷ τε κἀκείνοις 
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οἷς προῃρούμην (if I might appear to be carving gods and making some small statues for myself 
and for those whom I preferred) (3). He wants to be able to display his new skills and be admired 
for them, because this will affirm his new identity as a sculptor. When Tekhne and Paideia 
mention each other in their speeches, both also point out the other (δείξασα τὴν ἑτέραν), clearly 
directing the speaker’s gaze from one to the other so that he will notice the contrast between 
them. Since the identity of each figure is defined as the antithesis of the other, the emphasis of 
this contrast is notable. Paideia shows (ἐδείκνυεν) the newly-educated and finely-dressed 
speaker to his father, thereby confirming his new identity (16). Also important are words 
referring to praise (ἐπαίνω), which occur as a reaction to seeing what is impressive or 
noteworthy, and add to the importance of the gaze. As the speaker rides across the sky in 
Paideia’s flying chariot, he receives praise from spectators below, who are apparently impressed 
by his paideia, or simply his appearance, for no distinction is made. He recalls that he scattered 
something – perhaps to represent speeches or other displays of learning – but he cannot 
remember what it was:   
οὐκέτι μέντοι μέμνημαι ὅ τι τὸ σπειρόμενον ἐκεῖνο ἦν, πλὴν τοῦτο μόνον ὅτι 
κάτωθεν ἀφορῶντες ἄνθρωποι ἐπῄνουν καὶ μετ᾽ εὐφημίας καθ᾽ οὓς γενοίμην 
τῇ πτήσει παρέπεμπον  
Indeed, I no longer remember what the thing scatter was, but only this: men 
watching from below were praising me and, with praises from those whom I passed 
in flight, they sent me on my way (15). 
The aspect of the experience he can clearly recall is the praise directed toward him, which 
implies this is what creates his new status as a pepaideumos. The nature of the speaker’s 
transformation suggests that in the terms of this text, the gaze of others and their approval of 
one’s appearance are the means by which identity is constructed. It matters what you look like, 
and how other people see you, because that is how you know who you are.  
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 With so much importance placed on presentation, there are some interesting gaps in the 
speaker’s presentation of himself and his recollections. He first claims that his recollection of 
this dream is as vivid as if it had just happened:  
ἔτι γοῦν καὶ μετὰ τοσοῦτον χρόνον τὰ τε σχήματά μοι τῶν φανέντων ἐν τοῖς 
ὀφθαλμοῖς παραμένει καὶ ἡ φωνὴ τῶν ἀκουσθέντων ἔναυλος: οὕτω σαφῆ 
πάντα ἦν  
Even after so much time the forms of what appeared to me still remain in my eyes 
and the sound of what was heard rings in my ears: everything was so clear (5). 
Later, however, he admits to having forgotten a few details: he cannot remember the end of 
Tekhne’s speech, because it failed to hold his interest: ἀλλ᾽ οὐκέτι μέμνημαι: τὰ πλεῖστα γὰρ 
ἤδη μου τὴν μνήμην διέφυγεν (but I no longer remember: already most things escaped my 
memory) (8). He also, as mentioned above, forgot what he scattered when riding in Paideia’s 
chariot, although he did remember the praise he received. Clearly, then, he remembered only 
what he considers important, or at least, he is only interested in telling us what he thinks is 
important. How do we know, then, if the speaker is representing himself as he is or as he wants 
to appear? One might recall also the reference to the Iliad with which he opened the account of 
his dream. Although this certainly could be seen as adding the weight of tradition to his story, it 
becomes more suspect when one remembers the full story of Agamemnon’s dream: Agamemnon 
chooses not to tell his army the truth of his dream, which was a message from Zeus urging him to 
attack Troy, but lies to them instead, saying that Zeus told him to sail home. If the speaker is 
modeling himself after this, does the story he gives us represent the “true” version of the dream, 
or the false one? The same stakes of appearance are implied for the speaker of the story himself, 
as for his characters, and by explicitly wavering on his own account, he makes the audience 
question whether or not to believe him.  
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 Appearance is not the only prominent theme in the text, for Paideia and Tekhne are 
differentiated not only by how they look, but also by how they speak. The speaker describes 
Tekhne’s speech as almost unintelligible, stumbling over her words as she tries to persuade him: 
Ταῦτα καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλείονα διαπταίουσα καὶ βαρβαρίζουσα πάμπολλα εἶπεν ἡ Τέχνη, 
μάλα δὴ σπουδῇ συνείρουσα καὶ πείθειν με πειρωμένη (Tekhne said these things and still 
more of them, stuttering much and speaking a great deal of gibberish, stringing together words 
very much in haste and trying to persuade me) (8). The speaker’s clearly adverse reaction to her 
and his eager preference for Paideia imply that Paideia’s manner of speaking is as appealing as 
her clothes. This sets up the second important theme of Somnium: it not only matters how one 
appears, but also how one speaks, and whether or not one has the power to speak in a skillful 
way. Speaking is set in contrast to doing physical labor and producing physical objects, rather 
than words. In the first description of Tekhne it is mentioned that her hands are heavily calloused 
from her work (τὼ χεῖρε τύλων ἀνάπλεως) (6). When Paideia then tries to dissuade the speaker 
from choosing that path, she uses words that refer explicitly to manual labor: if the speaker 
chooses to follow Tekhne, he will be a χειρῶναξ (mechanic) and make a life with his hands 
(ἀποχειροβίωτος); both terms contain the word for hand (χεῖρ). He will always be bent over, 
toiling with his hands (κολαπτῆρας ἐν ταῖν χεροῖν ἕξεις κάτω νενευκὼς εἰς τὸ ἔργον) (you 
will hold a chisel in your hands, bending down over your work) (13). The choice of these words 
puts sculpture in a negative light, portraying it not as fine artistry but rough, mean labor that 
wears out the hands.  
In contrast, Paideia and her path are connected to words and actions on a mental, rather 
than physical, level. The speaker’s training under her will emphasize the mastery of speech: 
λόγους αὐτῶν ἀπαγγελῶ, καὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔμπειρον ἀποφανῶ (I will relate the words 
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[of great men], and I will render you experienced in speaking of all things) (10), and having 
learned from the ancient experts he will attain the “power of speaking” (τὸν λέγειν δυνάμενον) 
(9). Aided by this mastery of words, the speaker rises up in a flying chariot with Paideia and 
looks down on the world from above (ἀρθεὶς δὲ εἰς ὕψος ἐγὼ ἐπεσκόπουν ἀπὸ τῆς ἕω 
ἀρξάμενος ἄχρι πρὸς τὰ ἑσπέρια πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη καὶ δήμους) (raised up to a height I looked 
down from the uttermost east to the west upon cities and nations and peoples) (15), the antithesis 
of the “bending down low” he would have done as a sculptor. The power of speaking is what 
will allow the speaker not to be a wretched βαρβαρίζουσα like Tekhne, but instead to be on the 
same elevated level as other pepaideumenoi. 
 However, this contrast is problematic because it is not a simple matter of trading fame 
with words for ignobleness with labor. Tekhne also promises that as a sculptor, the speaker will 
win glory for himself, his father, and his country: πῶς μὲν οὐ κλεινὸς αὐτὸς παρὰ πᾶσιν 
ἀνθρώποις ἔσῃ, ζηλωτὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἀποδείξεις, περίβλεπτον δὲ ἀποφανεῖς καὶ τὴν 
πατρίδα (How would you yourself not be glorious before all men, and you will make your father 
appear enviable, and even show off your fatherland as admired) (8). He will receive praise, just 
not because of his words (οὐδὲ ἐπὶ λόγοις ... ἐπαινέσονταί σε πάντες) (and not for words … all 
will praise you) (7).
22
 Paideia makes a promise that sounds much the same: ἅπασι ζηλωτὸς καὶ 
ἐπίφθονος ἔσῃ, τιμώμενος καὶ ἐπαινούμενος (you will be envied and regarded with jealousy 
by all, honored and praised) (11). From this we might conclude that the choice between the two 
is essentially arbitrary, or even based on the speaker’s desire to pick what seems like the easy 
road to fame rather than one lined with toils.  
                                                 
22
 There is a lacuna in the text at this point.  
22 
 
Why is the kind of fame offered by Paideia more appealing to the speaker than that 
offered by Tekhne? The answer to this seems to take us back to the importance of appearances. 
In this text, it matters how one is seen. If the speaker becomes a sculptor, he will be famous for 
his statues; these are what people will look at and praise, giving him only a passing glance: μὲν 
τέχνην ἅπαντες ἐπαινέσονται, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ὅστις τῶν ἰδόντων, εἰ νοῦν ἔχοι, εὔξαιτ᾽ ἂν σοὶ 
ὅμοιος γενέσθαι (everyone will praise your craft, but not one of those looking, if he has sense, 
would pray to become the same sort of thing as you) (9). But if he becomes a pepaideumenos, he 
will be famous for his speeches; he himself, as a performer and notable figure, will be what 
people notice and point out to each other: τῶν ὁρώντων ἕκαστος τὸν πλησίον κινήσας δείξει 
σε τῷ δακτύλῳ, ‘οὗτος ἐκεῖνος’ ’λέγων) (each of the those looking, urging on his neighbor, will 
point you out with his finger, saying, “That’s him”) (11-12). In the terms that Somnium has set, it 
is preferable to be seen and praised oneself; attention and praise directed at some object you have 
created is not sufficient. If no one knows or cares who you are, you will never amount to 
anything.  
 The themes of appearance and speaking in the text intersect to construct the terms by 
which the pepaideumenos should be identified: one must be seen and praised for one’s own 
body, one’s own words. In a sense, we are back where we started, seeing the Somnium as an 
exposition and defense of the speaker’s paideia. However, by the time we have reached this 
interpretation of the text, the speaker’s claims are already problematic. The text links itself to 
classical tradition by borrowing tropes from Xenophon and Homer, but promptly manipulates 
them, displacing the story from the foundation we expect.  It has become a break with tradition, 
rather than a link, a moral fable transformed into a clever but equivocal rhetorical device. 
Instead, the text offers a contrast between high and low status, defined through public 
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presentation and performance, which divides those who are educated and those who are not. 
Paideia can elevate an individual so he is seen and pointed out by all, and this status is more 
desirable than the lowly laborer whom no one sees. But this too quickly begins to break down, 
because the fixation on appearances starts to ring hollow. We are led to wonder if the speaker’s 
transformation into a pepaideumenos is only a change of clothing, and thus only an illusion 
bolstered by empty praise. The speaker makes a point of emphasizing the accuracy of his story, 
yet there are gaps in his memory; we do not know if he is trustworthy. By trying to defend his 
paideia he undermines it, and in undermining his own claims the speaker brings down paideia in 
general. If we are to mark the pepaideumenos by his appearance, how do we know if he has 
legitimate claim to paideia, or if he just pretends to with a purple-bordered cloak and a crowd of 
admirers? 
  It is possible, therefore, to read Somnium as a blunt satire of the making of a 
pepaideumenos, particularly of paideia as expressed through rhetorical performance. Isn’t it 
absurd, Lucian asks, that we should pay so much attention to an educated orator, his appearance 
and his words, when clearly these can easily be deceiving? Perhaps he is showing how rhetoric, 
unmoored from moral or philosophical underpinnings, has been reduced to merely the power to 
persuade the gullible of one’s own importance. Or perhaps the speaker, as Gera suggests, is 
ambivalent about the path that he has chosen and is expressing his doubts in this exposition.
23
 I 
am not content, however, to let the interpretation of the text end here. Lucian is not going to let 
us off that easily: at the very moment when we think we have peeled back the layers of his 
deception to the “real” meaning, we find that this, too, is just another mask. The satire of paideia 
that the Somnium constructs nevertheless confronts us with the force of what it knows to be true 
                                                 
23
 Gera 1995, 250.  
24 
 
about its own nature, and this makes it impossible to read this work simply as a critique of 
paideia.  
 To explain what I mean by this, it will be necessary to take a step back and consider the 
Somnium in a broader context. Within the text, as I have just demonstrated, paideia is linked to 
performance, and it is the display of the pepaideumenos that marks his identity. But I would also 
like to consider the text itself as a performance, and see what implications this has for our 
understanding of it. Although it is impossible to know for certain whether the Somnium was 
performed or in what context, the form of the work suggests that it was. This piece is one of 
Lucian’s prolaliai, short works in a style originally intended as introductions to longer speeches, 
but a style that Lucian took on and developed as an art in its own right. Moreover, the text reads 
as if it were a performance: the speaker addresses his audience, and imagines their reactions. 
This does not necessarily mean that Lucian, as the author and likely the performer of the piece, 
can be identified with the speaker, but it does add another layer of meaning to the situation it 
enacts. That is, if it was performed, this means that the Somnium is a rhetorical performance 
about rhetorical performance.  
 A number of authors have addressed the importance of rhetorical performance as 
evidence of an individual’s paideia and the accompanying social status in the Second Sophistic, 
and the ancient Greco-Roman world in general. Under the Roman Empire, oratory lacked much 
of the political importance it had had under independent Greek city-states, but it nevertheless 
continued to be a prominent part of public life. For the Greek elite, paideia functioned as a form 
of “cultural capital” that allowed them to display their status and compete with other elites, 
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analogous to the donation of impressive public works.
24
 Display is a crucial word here. As Maud 
Gleason explains it,  
Ancient education was innocent of the sort of objectification effected by degrees and 
credentials that renders all holders of the same credential formally interchangeable… 
In the absence of such standardization … cultural capital tends to be incorporated in 
particular individuals, who must compete with directly with each other to establish 
relationships of dominance and authority… Those who pursued paideia may have 
acquired their linguistic competence in literary dialect initially by reading, but they 
had to display it by speaking.
25
    
Within a culture that is still based largely around face-to-face interaction, a significant part of an 
individual’s identity is formed by how he presents himself and how others respond to his display. 
Every time an ancient orator made a speech, he had to prove his identity as an elite, educated 
man in competition with others of the same rank. As a performer, both his appearance and his 
words were on display and subject to intense scrutiny. It does, in fact, matter what you look like 
and how others see you, as well as how you speak – when you are performing rhetoric. 
In her study of the self-presentation of orators in the Roman world, Gleason has 
addressed the physical dimension of rhetorical performance and the many ways in which the 
orators of the Second Sophistic engaged with it. Physiognomy and deportment were signs which 
marked supposedly innate qualities, particularly gender, and could be decoded and read by a 
discerning viewer.
26
 This was complicated in practice, because although norms of gender and of 
the body existed, they were always open to interpretation in any given individual. An orator who 
failed to live up to masculine standards in his gait or pitch of voice might be subject to ridicule, 
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but even one who appeared thoroughly “masculine” could be suspected of concealing a deviant 
nature.
27
 A successful orator, therefore, needed to be concerned with how he appeared, and 




 Proper speech was also a matter of concern: the writers and orators of the Second 
Sophistic, including Lucian, used classical Attic, which marked them both as the educated elite 
and as preservers of an authentic “Greek” culture and literary tradition. A failure to Atticize 
properly, even a careless verbal slip, put these aspects of one’s identity under question.29 Yet 
Atticism was not, as Whitmarsh has shown, necessarily a fixed standard to which one could only 
conform or deviate, any more than manhood was necessarily a static identity with fixed 
physiognomic marks; rather, these identities were constantly being enacted and negotiated in 
performance by the orators themselves.
30
 Paideia in the Second Sophistic existed in a context of 
cultural conservatism that was concerned that the past should be correctly imitated and 
transmitted. To fail to do so would be less than authentically “Greek”. At the same time, in any 
given rhetorical performance, improvisation within traditional frameworks was part of the 
display expected of an orator to impress his audience.
31
 A successful orator, therefore, was not so 
much one who followed the rules as one who knew how to use them to his advantage, balancing 
tradition and innovation, norm and deviance.  
 The crucial point for us here is that the ability to present oneself to one’s own advantage 
mattered a great deal for an orator. The speaker of the Somnium has gotten it right after all: he 
understands that to be a pepaideumenos, it is necessary to be seen by others in a favorable light, 
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and to do this, one needs to have control over one’s appearance and speech. Without these 
things, paideia has no value as cultural capital, and the speaker would be at a disadvantage 
relative to the educated elite within his society. When viewed from this angle, the themes of 
presentation and speech have a more serious implication. The “rules seem trivial only to those 
who do not acknowledge the importance of the game;” what is at stake is not merely the chance 
of being famous, but the opportunity to be heard at all.
32 
Tekhne, with her grubby appearance and 
“βαρβαρίζουσα” speech, does not have the advantages of paideia, and she pays for it in the end 
when she turns to stone. This bizarre transformation seems comical on the surface, but it also 
represents a permanent act of silencing. Tekhne can say nothing more to plead her case, and she 
serves as a warning to anyone foolish enough to follow her path. Only by acquiring paideia do 
you gain a voice, or as Paideia puts it, the power of speaking (τὸν λέγειν δυνάμενον); 
otherwise, you too will be silenced.   
 Somnium, it seems, has been playing an elaborate game. The speaker presents 
conventions which he then manipulates, and a claim which he promptly gives us reason to doubt. 
At the same time, not only does the speaker prove that he is familiar enough with the classical 
tradition to twist it to his own ends, but he also clearly shows that he understands what it means 
to display paideia in his society. He knows what the rules of the game are; in fact, he knows 
them so well that he is able to satirize them, and still have them work to his advantage. Paideia 
may indeed be nothing more than a false appearance, but ultimately it doesn’t matter, because it 
is a mask that the speaker retains full control over. If we consider that this piece is itself a 
performance, composed and recited by an actual orator, this becomes doubly true. In just this 
short, simple piece, Lucian is able to construct multiple levels of meaning simultaneously. He is 
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only able to do this because he has the “τὸν λέγειν δυνάμενον”, the power of speaking acquired 
through paideia. The Somnium is a display of the paideia, but it takes the form of a satire of the 
display of paideia: Lucian gets to have it both ways. Moreover, the audience of this performance 
is implicated in the game he has devised. If the audience members are pepaideumenoi, they will 
recognize the references to classical tradition and how they have been changed, and they will 
understand what stakes are involved in rhetorical performance.  Only then can they understand 
the satire. But to get the joke is to realize that it is on you, because your complicity in the display 
and the paideia that enables it are being questioned. You have been taken in by a performance 
that questions its own authenticity, and yet you still find it convincing in the end.  
 Thus we see that Somnium, far from the funny little biographical sketch it appears at first 
glance, is a cleverly constructed work engaged with the complicated questions of what paideia 
should be and what it means to acquire it. Though he uses a fantastic dream scenario to tell this 
story, Lucian is clearly aware of what meanings it has in the real world of the educated elite 
culture. If, however, we are trying to make sense of all the questions Somnium has raised 
concerning paideia, the conclusion that the text can be read against itself is ultimately 
unsatisfying, because we still do not understand why Lucian would choose to construct a piece in 
this way. He has cleverly manipulated his audience, to be sure, but to what ends? To try to 
understand this, it will be necessary to look beyond this story alone. Somnium gives us a version 
of the start of the pepaideumenos’s career, but there is still more to come. In the next chapters I 
will examine two other texts, Rhetorum Praeceptor and Bis Accusatus, which deal with the 
pepaideumenos at different points along his road to educational mastery. There are several points 
of departure from the present analysis that will lead to significant themes in these other works, 
and hopefully to a fuller understanding of what Lucian is doing in Somnium.  
29 
 
 The first of these is the theme of clothing and physical adornment, which crops up 
repeatedly in Lucian’s work. Clothing functions as a marker of identity, whether social status and 
education level, as we saw in this text, or gender and cultural or ethnic identity, and the visible 
display of adornment is how that identity is recognized by the rest of the world. Changing 
clothes can be a way of transforming one’s identity. However, whether the identity marked by 
clothing is authentic representation or a simulated disguise continues to be a matter of concern. 
The question Lucian prompts us to ask in Somnium, whether paideia was just a change of 
clothing or something more, has still not been answered. In a context where presentation is so 
important for establishing identity, yet also so easily manipulated, what meanings can we assign 
to appearance? Further analysis will attempt to address this issue.  
 Finally, there is one other aspect of paideia that Somnium deals with briefly which may 
be further illuminated by consideration of other texts. This is the connection between paideia and 
space, movement, and boundaries, and the relationship between these and identity. One of the 
advantages Paideia offers is that she will allow the speaker to travel beyond the borders of the 
native land; Techne explicitly says that her path will foreclose this: οὔποτε ἄπει ἐπὶ τὴν 
ἀλλοδαπήν, τὴν πατρίδα, καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους καταλιπών (you will never go away to another 
country, leaving behind your fatherland and household) (7). Paideia not only determines how 
one is seen and whether one has a voice, but also whether or not one has the ability to move 
through space and across borders. When the speaker rides across the sky, in Paideia’s chariot, 
over many cities and peoples (πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη καὶ δήμους) (16) he is enacting the mobility 
across geographical space that paideia promises to give him. This movement extends beyond 
real traveling between cities and across national boundaries to metaphorical mobility along social 
and cultural lines. The speaker’s lofty position in Paideia’s chariot, high above crowds of 
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admiring spectators, is a literal enactment of his rise in social status. The connection between 
paideia and movement, therefore, seems to fit straightforwardly with the overall characterization 
of paideia in the Somnium: by acquiring it, one achieves a more illustrious social position, and in 
the terms set by the text, this is more desirable than being a common laborer. Because of the 
ability to cross boundaries afforded by paideia, it is even possible for someone not born into a 
high social position to ascend to one by choosing the right path.  
 This suggests that the opinion of the speaker’s father, which determines the first, failed 
stage of his career, is in fact mistaken. One does not need high social status to pursue paideia; 
this can be gained through the pursuit itself. Likewise, although this is barely expressed in the 
Somnium itself, paideia may also allow someone to metaphorically cross cultural boundaries, to 
become “Greek” even if he was not born so. Here, perhaps, is the reason for the speaker to 
defend his paideia. He may have originally been a cultural and social outsider, but he has 
transformed himself into a pepaideumenos, and he wants his audience to know that. His speech 
demonstrates the ways in which paideia can transform identity in order to legitimize his own 
transformation. This would have been especially significant if Lucian himself had appeared 
foreign or strange in some way. However, by the time that this piece has brought the audience 
from the speaker’s humble beginnings to his present fame, the terms which we have to 
understand the transformative power of paideia have already become complicated under the 
multiple layers of Lucian’s satire. Appearances, we have been told, are of great importance, yet 
possibly deceiving. Lucian is both expertly utilizing paideia and constantly undermining it. In 
other texts, when we encounter the pepaideumenos at later points along his path, the relationship 
between his education and his identity will become even more important, but no less 
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problematic. Whatever power paideia has to create social and cultural change, it is not simple, 



























Lucian’s Rhetorum Praeceptor (the Orators’ Teacher) deals with the process of acquiring 
paideia necessary for becoming a professional public speaker. While the narrator of the Somnium 
had to choose between paideia and another career, for the subject of Rhetorum Praeceptor, that 
choice has already passed. Instead, this piece is an extended address to an unnamed young man 
who, we are told, wants to be a famous orator, instructing him in the best strategy for achieving 
his goal. However, under this didactic guise is a satirical aim, for the model of oratory the 
speaker upholds is the “wrong” one: showy, tasteless, and lacking true skill. Praeceptor mocks 
this style of rhetoric by ironically advocating it as the surest and easiest road to success, and 
thereby attacking those who attempt to grab fame by pretending to be “real” orators in this 
manner.    
Although there is no reason to think that the subjects of Somnium and Rhetorum 
Praeceptor, or even the perspectives of the two pieces, necessarily have any direct relation to 
one another, they are linked by the assumptions about the appeal of paideia we saw in the 
previous text and the questions these raise. At the beginning of Praeceptor, the speaker 
acknowledges his addressee’s reason for pursuing the study of rhetoric: ἀβίωτα γάρ εἶναί σοι 
φής, εἰ μὴ τοιαύτην τινὰ τὴν δύναμιν περιβάλοιο ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἄμαχον εἶναι καὶ 
ἀνυπόστατον καὶ θαυμάζεσθαι πρὸς ἁπάντων καὶ ἀποβλέπεσθαι (you say that life is 
unlivable for you, if you do not possess some sort of power in words so as to be unconquerable 
and irresistible, and be admired and looked at by all) (1). The status of a pepaideumenos who 
displays his learning through public speaking is desirable because it allows him to be seen and 
heard; that is taken for granted. The only question is how this should be obtained.  
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 The speaker of Praeceptor offers his youthful student a different choice, that of the path 
he will take to become educated and achieve mastery of rhetoric. As in Somnium, this choice is 
described in literal terms: two roads that lead up a mountain to where a personified Rhetorike 
(Rhetoric) sits surrounded by admirers; two guides to lead a hopeful seeker along his way. If he 
can reach the top of the mountain, the young man will marry Rhetoric and obtain the fame and 
riches she affords. One road is long and toilsome, its guide tough and manly; the other is smooth 
and short, serviced by a flamboyant, effeminate guide. The speaker focuses on the latter and 
advocates choosing him, but it becomes increasingly apparent that that this path and guide 
represent everything that an orator should not do or be. Lucian’s satirical attack is constructed 
upon an opposition between a legitimate, authentic kind of rhetoric, practiced by real 
pepaideumenoi, and an illegitimate, fake kind attempted by posers and charlatans. However, the 
placement of authenticity is not as simple as it seems. Lucian cannot expose the false orator 
without the risk of taking down the good orator with him, a threat which lingers behind every 
assertion in the text. The problems that arise within this opposition open up cracks in the façade 
of the text where the complexities of paideia and Lucian’s attitude towards it can be explored 
more fully. 
 The opposition between the two approaches to rhetoric is apparent in the descriptions of 
the bodies of the two guides and the recommendations that are given to the subject regarding the 
role of his physical appearance in his speeches. Erik Gunderson interprets this focus on bodies 
and the physical dimension of oratory as indicative of a politics of sex and gender that real 
orators had to confront in their public performances.
33
 Specifically, the effeminate guide is 
despicable because he attempts to display his body and his oratory as a source of pleasure in a 
way that is not socially acceptable for a “real” Greek (or Roman) man to do. However, as 
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Gunderson shows, all orators and their bodies are on display, and the scrutiny that attacks the 
illegitimate manhood of the effeminate guide also threatens to expose the manly guide as another 
kind of pretended appearance. I focus on Gunderson’s analysis because it is useful for showing 
both how the opposition between the two approaches oratory is meaningful in the cultural 
context of the Second Sophistic, and also how Lucian displaces aspects of that context in order to 
make the opposition problematic. However, I intend to extend my argument beyond the bodies of 
the orators and from there explore the implications that Lucian’s displacement has for my 
interpretation of the text.   
 Like the figures of Tekhne and Paideia, the two guides are sharply contrasted in the 
descriptions of their physical appearance. The guide to the hard road has a hard (ὑπόσκληρος) 
and tanned body (πολὺν τὸν ἥλιον ἐπὶ τῷ σώματι δεικνύων) (showing much sun on his body), 
a manly look in his eye (ἀρρενωπὸς τὸ βλέμμα) and an appropriately masculine gait 
(ἀνδρώδης τὸ βάδισμα) (9). The guide of the easy route has a womanly expression (γυναικεῖον 
τὸ βλέμμα), a mincing step (διασεσαλευμένον τὸ βάδισμα), and he gives off a smell of 
perfume (μύρων ἀποπνέοντα). He will be instantly recognizable, the narrator says, by his 
honey-sweet voice (μελιχρὸν τὸ φώνημα) (11). These feminine attributes, as well as his bent 
neck (ἐπικεκλασμένον τὸν αὐχένα) and habit of scratching his head with one finger (τῷ 
δακτύλῳ ἄκρῳ τὴν κεφαλὴν κνώμενον) mark this guide as a cinaedos, a man who plays the 
passive role in a sexual relationship, considered degrading in Greek and Roman culture for men 
past adolescence.
34
 Thus, this initial description is meant to portray this guide and his path in a 
negative light, despite the speaker’s excessive praise of him as a wise and beautiful orator. At 
this point in his speech, however, the narrator switches tactics: he invites the effeminate guide to 
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speak for himself, positing the advice he would have for the student of rhetoric. This “donning 
the mask” of the guide, as Gunderson puts it, enables him to extend the satire without shattering 
the character under the force of the veiled insults against him.
35
 It also continues the focus on the 
effeminate, flamboyant body and the kind of oratory it represents, for the instructions he gives 
the student are meant to lead to a replication of his own style and appearance.  
 The introductory description of the effeminate guide characterizes him as a false or 
illegitimate kind of man, a preening poet like Agathon of Aristophanes’ Lysistrata, to whom he 
is compared (11). The advice he offers would lead his pupil to be the same. Instead of proper, 
manly self-restraint, he says, one should approach oratory with wanton shamelessness, and be 
willing to do anything: κόμιζε τοίνυν τὸ μέγιστον μὲν τὴν ἀμαθίαν, εἶτα θράσος, ἐπὶ τούτοις 
δὲ τόλμαν καὶ ἀναισχυντίαν (bring first the greatest ignorance, then daring, on top of these 
boldness and shamelessness) (15). Dress in white or bright colors with an eye to showing off 
one’s body (ἡ ἐσθὴς δὲ ἔστω εὐανθὴς ἢ λευκή … ὡς διαφαίνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα) (15). As he 
continues in this vein, the performance of oratory becomes conflated with sex and the orator 
himself an object of pleasure. The guide encourages his student to have, or pretend to have, 
affairs with both women and men to bolster his reputation as a speaker, and if his aim is to 
please, then his mouth can serve other purposes as well as speaking (ἡ γλῶττα ὑπηρετείτω καὶ 
πρὸς τοὺς λόγους καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ὁπόσα ἂν δύνηται) (let your tongue be serviceable both 
for your speeches and for other things however much it is able) (23). All of this goes against 
dignified standards of behavior, and the audience is supposed to be repulsed by it.  
 The relentless focus on the physical appearance of the orator is thus an ideal means of 
insulting a false example of one, and it is certainly possible to read nothing more than that into 
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this text. However, from a more suspicious perspective, the picture of a flashy performer 
presented in the description of the effeminate guide, as well as his advice on how to look and act, 
seem a bit too much like a logical extension of what an orator is supposed to do. Comparing the 
figures here with those in Somnium, the effeminate guide is more like good-looking Paideia, and 
the weather-beaten guide like grubby Tekhne. This recalls the complicated issues that 
appearance held in that text, which suggests perhaps that the same terms still apply: for a 
pepaideumenos, appearances do matter. The shameless orator may take this too far, but the fact 
of his existence should still make the legitimate speaker uneasy. Gunderson locates a similar 
ambiguity within the text of Rhetorum Praeceptor: the personified Rhetoric at the end of the 
path, the prize the student seeks as a bride, is described in erotic, even exotic terms. She too is 
beautiful and fair of face (καλὴ καὶ εὐπρόσωπος) and surrounded by admirers like so many 
little cupids (οἱ ἔπαινοι περὶ πᾶσαν αὐτὴν Ἔρωσι μικροῖς ἐοικότες πολλοὶ) (6). Moreover, she 
is compared to the Nile (6), an oddly foreign characterization of a goal that should be the 
epitome of Greek paideia. Gunderson notes that both roads, and thus both styles of oratory, lead 
to this same Rhetoric, which is problematic if they need to be carefully distinguished.
36
 Rhetoric 
is a fixed entity; the only difference is whether it is practiced by a real pepaideumenos or a 
fake.
37
 This hints at a larger problem in the performance of rhetoric. All orators are on display in 
performance, and this position brings them dangerously close to the status of those whose bodies 
are on display as objects of pleasure.
38
 Anyone may be prone to the kind of insults that Lucian is 
using here.  
 This does not necessarily mean that Lucian’s satire is any less effective, but it does begin 
to complicate the opposition between good and bad oratory upon which the attack rests. 
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Praeceptor depicts the proponent of the easy road to rhetoric as an illegitimate kind of man, only 
in doing so it also indicates how all orators are vulnerable to this accusation. A similar problem 
arises in the other part of the attack, the implication that the effeminate guide and anyone who 
follows him do not have a real mastery of paideia. The effeminate guide offers the easy road to 
Rhetoric that does not require endless sweat and toil, and so getting there means that one does 
not need to really become educated, only appear to be. The guide instructs his pupil to learn 
fifteen or so Attic words, τὸ ἄττα καὶ κᾆτα καὶ μῶν καὶ ἀμηγέπη καὶ λῷστε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα 
(“sundry”, “eftsoons”, “prithee”, “in some wise”, “fair sir”, and the like) (16) (trans. A. M. 
Harmon) and have them at the ready to add as a seasoning (ἥδυσμα) in his speech, whether or 
not they are necessary in the context. These words, which Harmon’s translation approximates 
with archaic-sounding English examples, do come from the dialect that proper orators would use, 
but this orator’s method relies on the impression of sophistication that a few cultured-sounding 
words give, rather than any real mastery of language. That is enough, the guide assures us, to 
make you appear educated: οὕτω γάρ σε ὁ λεὼς ὁ πολὺς ἀποβλέψονται καὶ θαυμαστὸν 
ὑπολήψονται καὶ τὴν παιδείαν ὑπὲρ αὐτούς, εἰ ‘ ἀποστλεγγίσασθαι τὸ’ ἀποξύσασθαι 
λέγοις, τὸ δ᾽ ἡλίῳ θέρεσθαι ‘ εἱληθερεῖσθαι’ (many common folk will look at you thus and 
interpret you as marvelous and beyond them in education [paideia], if you should say “strigiling 
off” for scraping off, and “solicalification” for warming in the sun) (17) The audience will be so 
impressed by your archaizing wordplay that they will not notice that your speech lacks substance 
or wit. Indeed, according to this guide, appearance, not substance, is all that matters. As long as 
you go about with a crowd of admirers and a book in your hand (ἀκόλουθοι πολλοὶ καὶ βιβλίον 
ἀεί) (15), you will pass for an orator; as long your cloak adorned with a purple stripe, no one will 
notice that it is of poor quality: ἡ πορφύρα μόνον ἔστω καλὴ καὶ εὐανθής, κἂν σισύρα τῶν 
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παχειῶν (only let the purple [stripe] be beautiful and bright, even if it is a goat’s-hair cloak of 
coarse thread) (16).  
 Like the spectacle of the guide’s effeminate body, these educational instructions are 
meant to seem ridiculous, and rightly so. Real pepaideumenoi, reading this text, or 
hypothetically, listening to an orator declaim in that manner, would instantly recognize him for 
the charlatan that he is, and distance themselves both from him and his gullible audience through 
assurance of their own mastery of the language he ostentatiously effects. Nevertheless, reading 
against the text, the trouble of appearances still lingers. The reference to purple clothing as the 
mark of an orator recalls the purple garment that marked the speaker’s transformation in 
Somnium. A purple stripe hints at both a possible link to Roman political power and at the 
display of wealth and privilege in general. Such a status symbol can, like a display of Attic 
Greek, be a legitimate sign of one’s paideia; by making it a cover for a fraudulent claim to 
paideia, the parody comes dangerously close to the truth. As Gunderson puts it, “To what extent 
is [the legitimate orator] not just a man with fifteen hundred or even fifteen thousand Attic 
words, a man with a purple stripe and a good cloak too?”39 It is a dangerous question to be 
asking, because it threatens not only the security of the opposition between the two orators, but 
also the security of audience’s position in laughing at the false orator. His fraudulent appearance 
is what makes him an object of ridicule, yet, as Lucian likes to remind us, appearance and 
presentation in rhetorical performance is how we mark a pepaideumenos in the first place. How 
do we, the audience, truly know if what we are seeing is real or not?  
 After he has finished with the niceties of dress and language, the effeminate guide has 
other equally provocative recommendations. He goes on to say, first, that one should not bother 
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reading any of the ancient authors, because they are too dull, and instead read more recent ones. 
He then gives advice for the construction of a speech, which if followed literally, would have the 
student blurting out nonsense. But the guide also recommends that his pupil fill up his speeches 
with clichéd references to classical history and literature:  
ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ὁ Μαραθὼν καὶ ὁ Κυνέγειρος, ὧν οὐκ ἄν τι ἄνευ γένοιτο. καὶ ἀεὶ ὁ 
Ἄθως πλείσθω καὶ ὁ Ἑλλήσποντος πεζευέσθω καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὑπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν 
βελῶν σκεπέσθω καὶ Ξέρξης φευγέτω καὶ Λεωνίδας θαυμαζέσθω καὶ τὰ 
Ὀθρυάδου γράμματα ἀναγιγνωσκέσθω, καὶ ἡ Σαλαμὶς καὶ τὸ Ἀρτεμίσιον καὶ 
αἱ Πλαταιαὶ πολλὰ ταῦτα καὶ πυκνά. 
Let Marathon and Cynegeirus, without which nothing would ever happen, be 
included in everything. Always let Athos be sailed through and the Hellespont be 
crossed on foot; and let the sun be covered by the arrows of the Medes and Xerxes 
flee and Leonidas be admired and the letters of Othryadus be read; and Salamis 
and Artemisium and Plataea, [pile] those on nice and thick (18).  
These allusions, which refer to various events of the Persian Wars in Herodotus’s Histories, 
serve the same purpose as a sprinkling of Attic words, creating the impression that the speaker is 
more educated than he is. This advice acknowledges another truth of legitimate oratory. An 
orator would be expected to include such references in his speeches, drawn from his extensive 
knowledge of the classical canon; a list of some these same Persian War events even appear as 
examples in a treatise on rhetoric by the second-century writer Hermogenes (On Types of Style 
1.6.246). This false speaker’s error is not failing to use literary allusions, but doing it badly, 
without true paideia to support it. Again, the difference between the legitimate and illegitimate 
orator seems to be one of degree rather than opposition.  
The attacks against the effeminate guide and his dubious rhetorical style, from his flashy 
clothing to his careless use of literary allusions, are mean to portray him as a “fake” orator: a 
clumsy imitation of what real rhetorical training and practice should look like. However, just as 
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the guide’s excessive focus on self-presentation and appearance was dangerously close to the 
legitimate orator, positing him as a false imitation likewise has implications for the “right” kind 
of oratory, and even for a true kind of paideia. In the Greek-speaking world, training in rhetoric 
had long been based around the imitation (mimesis) of traditional models; standard practice 
exercises (progymnasmata) often did use the same clichéd literary or historical examples.
40
 
Moreover, the very idea of paideia in the Second Sophistic relies upon the imitation (mimesis) of 
the past in order to replicate and preserve it.
41
 If we read Rhetorum Praeceptor with this central 
role of mimesis in mind, it makes the placement of legitimacy somewhat problematic. The satire 
requires us to assume that illegitimate orator is a false pretender, an imitator of true paideia, yet 
every orator is imitating to some degree simply because of the nature of his training. How then 
can we separate the two, if not by authenticity?  
Gunderson identifies in the text a finer, more malleable distinction between a “harder, 
manly imitation – presumably imitation of the truth – and an easier, effeminate imitation of 
wanton falsity.”42 Those who take the hard road to Rhetoric represent a supposedly truer kind of 
imitation, and therefore they can insist upon the authenticity of their own transformation while 
denying that of others: “I am; he merely seems.”43 Although specifically addressing gender, 
Maud Gleason’s analysis of the construction of masculinity is relevant here: “[ancient thinkers] 
shared a notion of gender identity built upon polarized distinctions … that purported to 
characterize the gulf between men and women but actually divided the male sex into legitimate 
and illegitimate members … Masculinity was still thought to be grounded in ‘nature’, yet it 
remained fluid and incomplete until firmly anchored by the discipline of an acculturative 
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process.”44 This slippage allowed an opponent to attack a suspected cinaedus both for apparent 
femininity and for possible over-compensating hyper-masculinity. In Praeceptor this same 
concept extends to all aspects of rhetorical performance and the trappings of paideia.  The 
“false” orator becomes an object of ridicule because he is only pretending to be a 
pepaideumenos, and not even doing a very good job of it. However, as Lucian’s satire takes on 
the ways in which that orator is pretending, it reminds us how similar they are to the methods of 
a real pepaideumenos, separated only by a matter of degree. The insult against this poser, 
therefore, actually depends on the negative qualities of what he “really” is, and the illusion that 
imitation of the legitimate orator is closer to the “truth”.  
 This close examination of the opposition between the two paths to rhetoric disrupts the 
implication that one of them is more authentic than the other. In unmasking the showy, 
effeminate guide as a poser, Lucian also suggests that all oratory is performance, and thus the 
manly orator is also performing his role as a proper pepaideuamenos, simply in a manner that 
insists upon its more legitimate claim to the truth. I would like to push this one step further and 
suggest that we need to question our assumptions about which voices in Rhetorum Praeceptor 
are authentic and what value we assign to the things they say. I will begin with the following 
example. In his laundry list of historical clichés to round out a speech, the guide of the easy road 
mentions this: ἀεὶ ὁ Ἄθως πλείσθω καὶ ὁ Ἑλλήσποντος πεζευέσθω (Always let Athos be 
sailed through and the Hellespont crossed on foot) (18). At first glance, there seems to be a joke 
in this, because Athos is a mountain on a peninsula and the Hellespont is a narrow strait of the 
Aegean, so it appears he has confused the proper way of crossing them. This is what we expect 
from such an ignorant orator; just a few sentences before, he encouraged the student to string 
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words together regardless of sense, even if he were to talk about putting a greave on the forehead 
(περὶ τῷ μετώπῳ μὲν ἡ κνημίς), and a helmet on the shin (περὶ τῇ κνήμῃ δὲ ἡ κόρυς) (18). But 
if you have read Herodotus, you will know that, in fact, the Persian king Xerxes dug a canal to 
go around Athos and built a bridge over the Hellespont. The guide’s statement is accurate after 
all. With that knowledge in mind, the humor shifts from a simple throwaway joke to the hint of 
something much more complicated. An audience of pepaideumenoi which recognizes the 
allusion will also see the implied threat of identifying an ignorant reader, who laughs 
unknowingly at the mix-up of words, with the despicable guide. This point in the text seems to 
cut through the mask of the false orator down to the mocking voice of the author. Yet it is all 
within the speech of the guide, the poser, whose exhortations are supposed to be the opposite of 
what is correct.  
 Hitherto we have assumed that the narrators of Praeceptor, both the effeminate guide and 
the speaker who directs us to him, are wholly satirical, expressing ideas that are being mocked by 
the author of the piece and which we are not supposed to take seriously. No proper orator would 
desire to be the sort of wanton cinaedus who is presented as our ideal model. Moreover, no one 
with any sense would think that his tasteless rhetorical style was equivalent to the speech of 
someone who had spent years educating himself and perfecting his craft. Even for a modern 
audience without cultural prejudice toward any particular style of rhetoric, it seems unreasonable 
that a short, easier road to fame would be better than a long and toilsome one, and therefore we 
are inclined to dismiss someone who makes such a claim. However, the example above suggests 
that we should not be too quick to judge what the “real” meaning of any one statement in the text 
might be. Instead, the meanings of the assertions presented throughout the text are constantly 
being destabilized, and they come to present a more complicated picture of the author’s purpose 
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than simply a satirical invective. As the first example suggests, the destabilization of meanings 
manifests itself most clearly in the many allusions and references that are woven into the text. In 
the next section I will explore the role of some of these allusions in greater detail and the 
additional possibilities for interpretation that they suggest. 
 If we can no longer dismiss everything that comes out of the mouth of the supposedly 
unreliable narrators of Praeceptor, it becomes necessary to deal with the points on which they 
seem to speak the truth. One constant refrain of the advocates of the easy road to rhetoric creates 
a persistent contradiction throughout the text. The student is advised to ignore the examples of 
ancient masters like Demosthenes or Plato, which the speaker describes as “stale” (ἕωλα) and 
“not easy to imitate” (οὐ ῥᾴδια μιμεῖσθαι). The text returns repeatedly to this image of the past 
as something so old and faded that it is not worth the herculean effort it would take to model 
oneself after it, not when fame is readily obtainable by easier means. Yet almost every point 
made in the text relies on the author’s clever reworking of references from literary and historical 
sources, and the audience’s knowledge of the past to interpret them. This may be partly for the 
sake of irony: an orator who had really taken the easy road and never learned the classics would 
not be able to fully understand the piece that mocks him. However, I think it also has other 
implications for the text. The first of these is that Lucian is aware of the contradiction he has 
created and is using it deliberately to subvert the claims of the text in various places. The second 
is that the element of truth in such disparagement of a reliance on the past, contradictory though 
it may be, points towards a comment that Praeceptor is making about paideia and the practice of 
oratory.  
 Especially in the first half of the text, there are several recurring themes to the allusions 
that the speaker uses. One is references to Hesiod and another, somewhat related, are mentions of 
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the Golden Age of humankind, the time of Kronos. Although they often seem to have been 
thrown in at random, taken together these references illustrate the thread of contradiction that 
Lucian is spinning through the text. Hesiod first appears when the speaker invokes him as an 
authority for a quick transformation into an orator: Ἡσίοδος μὲν ὀλίγα φύλλα ἐκ τοῦ Ἑλικῶνος 
λαβὼν αὐτίκα μάλα ποιητὴς ἐκ ποιμένος κατέστη (Hesiod, taking a few branches from 
Mount Helicon, at once became a poet from a shepherd) (4). If Hesiod could become a poet just 
by receiving a branch from the Muses, surely one can become an orator by some similarly 
painless means – a rather odd interpretation of that story. But what is even more interesting is 
that when he cites Hesiod again, the speaker seems to be disavowing him rather than using him 
as authoritative evidence. When he introduces the hard road to rhetoric, he declines to describe it 
in detail, saying that Hesiod has already done so (ἔφθη γὰρ ἤδη Ἡσίοδος εὖ μάλα ὑποδείξας 
αὐτήν, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δεήσει) (for Hesiod has already said it, having shown this road very 
well, so that it will not be necessary for me to do so) (7). But since this is the road he is urging 
the student not to take, he implies that whatever Hesiod had to say was of little merit. This 
disavowal of the ancient poet continues in a more veiled form when the speaker expresses regret 
that he toiled through the hard road himself, not knowing the easier way: οὐ γὰρ ἑώρων νέος ὢν 
ἔτι τὸ βέλτιον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ποιητὴν ἐκεῖνον ἀληθεύειν ᾤμην λέγοντα ἐκ τῶν πόνων φύεσθαι 
τὰ ἀγαθά (being young still I had not seen better, but I thought that poet spoke the truth when he 
said that good things arise from toils) (8). This recalls the proverb of Epicharmus quoted in 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia, τῶν πόνων πωλοῦσιν ἡμῖν πάντα τἀγάθ᾽ οἱ θεοί (the gods sell all 
good things to us at the price of toils) (Xen. Mem. 2.1.20). In Xenophon, this line is immediately 
preceded by another related quote from Works and Days:  
τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι ῥηιδίως: 
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 λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ᾽ ἐγγύθι ναίει. 
τῆς δ᾽ ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν 
ἀθάνατοι: μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν 
καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον: ἐπὴν δ᾽ εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηαι, 
ῥηιδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα. 
Badness can be got easily and in shoals; the road to her is smooth, and she lives 
very near us. But between us and Goodness the gods have placed the sweat of our 
brows; long and steep is the path that leads to her, and it is rough at the first; but 
when a man has reached the top, then is she easy to reach, though before that she 
was hard (Hes. WD 287-292, trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White).  
Hesiod’s imagery of the two roads mirrors that in Praeceptor, except that Lucian has reworked 
this allegory in a way that displaces its original meaning, much like he did with the choice of 
Heracles in Somnium. Good and bad are inverted, and rhetoric (or paideia) replaces both. The 
speaker twists these allusions so that they can all work in favor of the easy path.  
 Not only do these references invert the original meaning of Hesiod’s words, they also 
displace the meanings involved in the very fact of their use as allusions. Hesiod is first invoked 
as an exemplum and then dismissed as useless, but even the act of dismissal depends upon the 
assumption that he can be used as a point of reference. In other words, Lucian’s audience needs 
to have read Hesiod (and Xenophon) to understand what he is talking about; he says so himself 
in the passage quoted above (7). Yet the purpose for which he is using the reference is to tell us, 
in effect, that we should not bother reading Hesiod in the first place. Now everything has become 
rather confusing. Are we to take Hesiod as an authoritative example or not? For that matter, how 
can we correctly interpret any example that the speaker gives us? I think that the confusion here 
should be viewed not as careless inconsistency but as a deliberate strategy that allows the text to 
contain multiple layers of meaning even if they are contradictory. Just as the speaker of 
Praeceptor is simultaneously identifying with and distancing himself from the allusions he is 
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using, the confusion around what is really meant in the text at this point allows us to read his 
message both satirically and seriously. On one level, we can see this ridiculous twisting of 
Hesiod as discrediting the speaker’s claims; but at the same time we may also view it with a hint 
of truth, leading us to question why it is that we take for granted the wise authority of an ancient 
poet who got his gift from a sacred branch. Neither one of these is definitively the “correct” 
interpretation; instead, Lucian prompts his audience to consider both of them together, 
paradoxically.  
 A similar contradiction can be found in another scattering of references that, although not 
directly related to Hesiod, invoke the description in Works and Days of the Golden Age of man 
under Kronos. After he discusses his own foolish choice to take the hard road to rhetorical 
mastery, the speaker assures his addressee that he will have it much easier: σοὶ δὲ ἄσπορα καὶ 
ἀνήροτα πάντα φυέσθω καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ Κρόνου (may everything sprout for you unplanted 
and unplowed as in the time of Kronos) (8). The “ἄσπορα καὶ ἀνήροτα”, unplanted and 
unplowed, is a quote from the Odyssey, from a passage where Odysseus describes the land of the 
Cyclops (Hom. Od. 9.108-109), but also recalls Hesiod’s description of the time before 
agriculture, when the earth produced fruit without cultivation (Hes. WD 117-118). Another 
reference to agriculture appears in the description of the effeminate guide: μάθοις ἂν ὡς οὐχὶ 
τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἐστιν, “οἳ ἀρούρης καρπὸν ἔδομεν”, ἀλλὰ τι ξένον φάσμα δρόσῳ ἢ ἀμβροσίᾳ 
τρεφόμενον (you would learn that he is not one of us, “who eat the fruit of the field”, but some 
strange phantom fed on dew or ambrosia) (11). The “οἳ ἀρούρης καρπὸν ἔδομεν” is another 
quote, this time from the Iliad (6.142-3), which continues the metaphor of agriculture for 
prosperity: this guide does not need to plow or sow in order to reap the bounteous fruits of 
oratory, just as the student who follows him will enjoy the bounty of Rhetoric without toil. No 
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sooner is this connection between the easy road and the Golden Age established, however, than 
another contradictory reference arises to complicate it. The guide of the hard road, who 
supposedly represents everything that this Golden Age is not, is described as a man so ancient 
that he is still around from the age of Kronos: ἀρχαῖος ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ Κρονικὸς ἄνθρωπος (an 
ancient and truly Kronos-like man) (9). With this comparison suddenly the terms reverse 
themselves. Instead of taking us to a mythical time before drudgery, turning to the past leaves us 
only with something that is old in the sense of being outdated, no longer relevant. Which version 
of the age of Kronos should we believe? The answer, I would suggest, is both at once, or perhaps 
neither; the confusion is the point. The shifting of terms makes it difficult to identify one 
authoritative viewpoint in the text that would clearly distinguish the voice of the speaker and 
guide from that of the “author”, which allows Lucian to hint at different ideas without having to 
firmly declare one or the other. 
 In both of these examples, a string of allusions and themes, although related, seem to 
make contradictory points. This has the effect of obscuring certainty about the text, because it is 
confusing for the reader to determine what is supposed to be taken seriously and what is not. By 
virtue of this confusion, the text raises the possibility that more than one side of the apparent 
contradiction might be “true.” Perhaps Hesiod can be both a source of wisdom and an outdated 
literary legend of little relevance for the present. A man from the time of Kronos may have 
enjoyed prosperity without work, but if he were still around today, he would indeed be quite 
ancient. Perhaps, for a pepaideumenos of Lucian’s time, the past is as revered and irretrievable as 
a golden age. Yet the text is not saying that we should take the speaker’s or effeminate guide’s 
advice and not read Hesiod, because that would defeat the purpose of referencing him in the first 
place. Lucian still gets to have it both ways, as he did in Somnium, mocking paideia with his 
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own display of paideia. In Praeceptor this process is even more difficult to locate, I think, 
because the piece focuses so intently upon a negatively-portrayed figure, the effeminate guide, 
that it is tempting to brush aside the many pitfalls Lucian has laid along the way to tease his 
audience and prevent them from simply laughing at a despised opponent.  
 A point that Praeceptor does clearly make, if the audience is paying attention, is that the 
past is over and therefore that models of the past may be of limited use to the present. When the 
speaker describes what the guide of the hard road to rhetoric, that ancient “Κρονικὸς” (Kronos-
like) man, will tell his student to learn and why such things are worthless, he compares the words 
of the ancients to corpses that need to be dug up: νεκροὺς εἰς μίμησιν παλαιοὺς προτιθεὶς καὶ 
ἀνορύττειν ἀξιῶν λόγους πάλαι κατορωρυγμένους ([he will say these things] putting out 
ancient corpses for imitation and thinking it right to dig up words buried long ago) (10). What 
use are such examples for us nowadays, he asks, when times have changed: μαχαιροποιοῦ υἱὸν 
καὶ ἄλλον Ἀτρομήτου τινὸς γραμματιστοῦ ζηλοῦν ἀξιῶν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐν εἰρήνῃ μήτε 
Φιλίππου ἐπιόντος μήτε Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐπιτάττοντος, ὅπου τὰ ἐκείνων ἴσως ἐδόκει χρήσιμα 
(he will expect you to emulate the son of a sword-maker [Demosthenes] and another son of some 
clerk, Atrometus, and these things even in peacetime when no Philip is attacking and no 
Alexander drawing up troops, [at a time] when it seemed that there was equally need of those 
things) (10). It is impossible to ignore the truth in these words, no matter how much we try to 
discredit the speaker. Lucian is writing and practicing rhetoric in the second century CE, not the 
fourth or fifth centuries BCE. He and his fellow pepaideumenoi may be using language and 
rhetorical devices from those times, they may be impeccably versed in the history and literature 
from that era, but it is not their reality. Their rhetorical displays of paideia have value primarily 
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as means of accruing personal prestige and as a way to compete with other elites, rather than as 
instruments that sway political processes and turn wars, as they did in classical Athens.  
 The inconvenient truth of this assertion is the crux which brings us back to the opposing 
style of oratory represented by the two roads, their embodiment in the guides, and the question of 
authenticity. It suggests a reason why Lucian should have been showing us how all oratory, 
legitimate and illegitimate, is really a performed identity. The legitimate orator – the one who 
has taken the hard road, is steeped in true paideia, and strives to imitate Demosthenes – when we 
place this orator in the context of his own time, it seems that he is merely imitating a past 
existence that he can never fully reach. It is impossible for him to truly be like Demosthenes, 
because the historical conditions in which such orators lived no longer exist. He can only 
pretend, only imitate: this orator, too, is a poser. Perhaps he does not have the claim to 
authenticity that was assumed in distinguishing him from a follower of the easy road, and maybe, 
in fact, he is even more of a pretender than one who does not try to maintain the allusion that he 
is living in fourth-century Athens.  
I am not suggesting that we relocate the authenticity entirely upon the figure of the 
effeminate guide and what he represents; his negative depiction and lack of paideia still discredit 
the advice he would have his student follow. In Rhetorum Praeceptor, as in Somnium, Lucian is 
able to play multiple sides at the same time, satirizing his subject but also using that satire to 
point out problematic and uncomfortable truths. He manages to both uphold a traditional model 
of an elite, educated orator, and at the same time, to subvert it. Moreover, the text cautions us 
against taking any one voice alone to be completely “true,” as I have shown, and this warning 
still applies even at the point when it seems we can make sense of Lucian’s tricks. However, it is 
interesting to note that the original speaker presents himself as having taken the hard road, 
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though he now advocates the easy. Perhaps here is the orator that Praeceptor is implying we 
should aspire to be, one who has paideia but also understands its performative status and is 
aware of the continual inadequacy of his own imitation of the past. This speaker, for all his bad 
advice, may have had it right all along.  
























 Lucian’s Bis Accusatus (Twice Accused) returns to the matter that was central to 
Somnium, a defense of paideia. This time, however, the issue in question is not the process of 
education but the product of it, in the sense that paideia can mean “culture” as well as 
“education.” The setting is a courtroom conducted by the Olympian gods, in which a series of 
suits are put forth by personified Arts and Sciences (ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις) concerning 
mortals (3). In the final case, a figure called the “Syrian” is prosecuted first by Rhetoric, for ill-
treatment (κάκωσις), and then by Dialogue, for moral affront and insult (ὕβρις). It appears that 
the Syrian was trained in the art of rhetoric, but later abandoned her for philosophical dialogue; 
even then, however, he was not content to leave this art as he found it, instead mixing dialogue 
with comedy to create a new, bizarre-seeming genre. The nature of this case reverberates out 
from the text itself to the rest of Lucian’s corpus. The Syrian can be seen as a representation of 
the author’s persona, and his trial represents Lucian’s defense of his own seriocomic dialogues 
and other strange literary creations, of which Bis Accusatus is one. The text therefore aims to 
defend and secure its author’s claim to legitimacy within the literary tradition, with paideia as 
the key point of the argument.  
 What Bis Accusatus makes clear that Somnium and Rhetorum Praeceptor dealt with only 
in passing, is that paideia is by nature Greek, and that the social status it confers is specifically 
status within the Greek-speaking world and literary tradition. In this world the Syrian is an 
outsider, a “barbarian,” whose presence is as suspicious as his strange literary creations. Even the 
suitability of his case to be tried in a Greek courtroom is questioned:  
Ἑρμῆς 




τίς δὲ οὗτός ἐστιν; οὐ γὰρ ἐγγέγραπται τοὔνομα. 
Ἑρμῆς 
οὕτως ἀποκλήρου, τῷ ῥήτορι τῷ Σύρῳ: κωλύσει γὰρ οὐδὲν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ 
ὀνόματος. 
Δίκη 
ἰδοῦ, καὶ τὰς ὑπερορίους ἤδη Ἀθήνησιν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ ἀποκληρώσομεν, ἃς 
ὑπὲρ τὸν Εὐφράτην καλῶς εἶχε δεδικάσθαι;  
Hermes: Rhetoric against the Syrian for ill-treatment; Dialogue against the same for 
insult.  
Justice: Who is this man? For his name is not recorded.  
Hermes: Chose the lots for the jury thus, for the Syrian orator: even without the 
name nothing will hinder it.  
Justice: See here, shall we now allot Athenians in the Areopagus to the foreign cases, 
which would be better tried beyond the Euphrates? (14) 
 
The emphasis on his foreignness suggests that the implicit question on trial here, for both the 
character of the Syrian and the authorial persona he represents, is whether or not this non-Greek 
has the right to claim Greek paideia and use it the way he does. In this text, Lucian addresses this 
issue by drawing from elements of tradition but destabilizing them in ways that show how 
complex the notions of “Greekness” and paideia really are.  
 Although the trial of the Syrian is the part of Bis Accusatus that most directly relates to 
this question of paideia, it is necessary to first examine the large portion of text that precedes it, 
because Lucian begins to construct a framework for interpreting the final case long before the 
Syrian enters the courtroom. The piece begins with a rant by Zeus, who complains about how 
much trouble it is to be a god: ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιτριβεῖεν ὀπόσοι τῶν φιλοσόφων παρα μόνοις τὴν 
εὐδαιμονίαν φασὶν εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς. εἰ γοῦν ᾔδεσαν ὁπόσα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκα πάσχομεν 
(It vexes me how many philosophers say that good fortune is present for the gods alone; if only 
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they knew how much we suffer on account of mortals) (1). Instead of a grand image of the 
divine, he presents a comic portrait of divinities running hither and thither to serve the whims of 
humankind, with scarcely a moment to themselves. This initial image sets up the context of the 
piece in a number of ways. First, it establishes a tone of comic reversal: in this text, serious 
matters are going to be inverted and jumbled with lighter ones so that they seem absurd. This is 
exactly what Dialogue will accuse the Syrian of doing with his lofty philosophical subjects (33). 
The humor has the effect of disarming the audience; by taking conventions that everyone knows, 
like the gods as they might be depicted in Homer or another authoritative source, and inverting 
them, Lucian prompts his audience to consider the absurdity in the matters they hold most 
serious.  
 In terms of narrative, the plight of the gods offers a reason for why all of these cases 
should now be brought to trial. The gods have been so busy, Zeus explains, that a backlog of 
court cases is piling up, and many have now grown old and cobwebbed: ἰδοὺ γέ τοι ὑπ᾽ 
ἀσχολίας τοσαύτας ἑώλους δίκας φυλάττομεν ἀποκειμένας ὑπ᾽ εὐρῶτος ἤδη καὶ ἀραχνίων 
διεφθαρμένας (look how many old indictments we keep laid away because of business, now 
ruined by decay and cobwebs) (3). Zeus, in consultation with Hermes, resolves to take care of 
them straight away, and they summon Dike (Justice) to oversee these trials in Athens at the 
Areopagus. Hermes and Justice fly down to Athens, where they announce the cases and empanel 
jurors from the citizens of Athens to try them. In this way the gods’ presence sets in place a 
reasonably logical, if somewhat bizarre, explanation for the course of the narrative. However, it 
also has significant implications for the setting of the events in the text. Because the gods 
transcend time and space, they bridge the gap between past and present, allowing the suspension 
of disbelief necessary for this strange court session to take place. The trials are, presumably, set 
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in the present, but it is still possible for the old, cobwebbed cases from some vague past to stand 
alongside the recent case of the Syrian. In this sense the setting also transcends time, taking place 
not in any real past or present age but in a timeless classical Athens that seems to exist now just 
as it has before.  
The same duality works for geographical space. On the one hand, the setting is highly 
localized: there is an explicit decision to hold the trials in Athens, on the acropolis at the 
Areopagus. When Hermes and Justice arrive there, they mention specific geographical features 
around Athens (προΐωμεν, ὦ Δίκη, ταύτῃ εὐθὺ τοῦ Σουνίου μικρὸν ὑπὸ τὸν Ὑμηττὸν ἐπὶ τὰ 
λαιὰ τῆς Πάρνηθος, ἔνθα αἱ δύο ἐκεῖναι ἄκραι) (Justice, let us go to this place near Sunium, a 
little under Hymettus, upon the left of Parnassus, where those two peaks are) (8). At the same 
time, the gods are shown to transcend space; they have the ability to look down from heaven to 
all corners of the world at once, even to summon souls from the dead if they are needed for trial 
(ὁπόσοι δὲ ἀποθέμενοι γραφὴν πρὶν εἰσελθεῖν ἀπέθανον, καὶ τούτους ὁ Αἰακὸς 
ἀναπεμψάτω) (However many, having escaped an indictment, died before coming to trial, let 
Aiakos send these back up) (12). This suggests that the Athens to which they have come isn’t 
necessarily any more real than the time in which it is set, but exists only in the imagination.  
 Thus the setting of Bis Accusatus exists somewhere between the past and the present, in 
both a specific location that carries a wealth of significance in itself, and in the imaginary world 
of the gods and their affairs. This slippage creates a space where the improbable events of the 
narrative can take place with some semblance of logic. The compression of temporal and 
geographical distance allows a Syrian to stand trial alongside citizens of classical Athens, and 
implicitly, for him to be judged in full view of the Greek rhetorical and philosophical tradition he 
seems to be so casually toying with. At the same time, by reminding us that this space is 
55 
 
imaginary, the text highlights the actual gap between past and present and the leap of fantasy 
required to bridge it. I propose that the fantastical setting of Bis Accusatus invokes the literary 
imagination of the Second Sophistic, with its predominant focus on the historical legacy of 
Greek culture and on Athens as a cultural center. Here Lucian acknowledges the significance of 
this idealized time and place, while pointing out that they are, for present readers, an imaginary 
setting possible only in fiction. 
 Lucian adds another twist to the scenario right after we reach Athens. When Hermes and 
Justice arrive at the acropolis, they happen to meet the god Pan and chat with him about the 
current state of affairs in Athens. This encounter seems odd in the context of the narrative, for 
Pan plays no apparent role in the upcoming trials. Justice is also initially puzzled by his 
appearance, but Hermes explains:  
ἀγνοεῖς τὸν Πᾶνα, τῶν Διονύσου θεραπόντων τὸν βακχικώτατον; οὗτος ᾤκει 
μὲν τὸ πρόσθεν ἀνὰ τὸ Παρθένιον, ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν Δάτιδος ἐπίπλουν καὶ τὴν 
Μαραθῶνάδε τῶν βαρβάρων ἀπόβασιν ἧκεν ἄκλητος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις σύμμαχος, 
καὶ τὸ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου τὴν ὑπὸ τῇ ἀκροπόλει σπήλυγγα ταύτην ἀπολαβόμενος οἰκεῖ 
μικρὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πελασγικοῦ εἰς τὸ μετοίκιον συντελῶν.  
 
Don’t you recognize Pan, the most Bacchic of the followers of Dionysus? He came 
previously down from Parthenion, he sailed towards Datis, and at the ascent of the 
barbarians to Marathon he was present uncalled as an ally to the Athenians; and from 
that time, having received this cave under the acropolis, he dwells a little beyond the 
Pelasgicon, paying the metics’ tax (9). 
 
He identifies the Arcadian god as a metic, a resident alien who must pay a special tax to live in 
Athens, but does not have the full rights of an Athenian citizen. As a metic his status is 
somewhat ambiguous, neither fully included nor entirely foreign. However, Hermes also 
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mentions his importance to the city because of his role in aiding the Athenians during the battle 
of Marathon. This places Pan in an interesting position. He is clearly an outsider, not fully 
assimilated: Justice remarks on his horned (κερασφόρος) and hairy-legged (ὁ λάσιος ἐκ τοῖν 
σκελοῖν) appearance (9). Later Pan himself acknowledges that he is a rustic who lacks learning 
and culture: οὐκ οἶδα ὅλως ὅ τι καὶ λέγουσιν οὐδὲ συνίημι τὴν σοφίαν αὐτῶν ὄρειος γὰρ 
ἔγωγε καὶ τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα ῥημάτια, καὶ ἀστικὰ οὐ μεμάθηκα (I do not entirely know what 
they are even saying, nor do I understand their wisdom; as a mountain-dweller I have never 
learned these refined little phrases and urbane matters) (11). Nevertheless, Pan also has a central 
role in the development of the city of Athens, which distinguishes him from the rest of the 
barbarians, and he occupies a space near the heart of Athens in his cave on the side of the 
acropolis. Thus he is an outsider on the inside, a figure who is marginal yet very close to the 
center.  
 The issue of outsiders and insiders is also relevant to the figure of the Syrian, and by 
extension, to Lucian as the author of this work. I suggest that by including Pan at this point in the 
narrative, the text introduces the concept of an outsider on the inside, and in this way gives the 
audience a framework by which to view the Syrian when they later encounter him. It is not that 
Pan stands for the Syrian, per se; rather, Pan’s story reminds us that even at the center of a 
quintessentially Athenian context there are elements of supposed foreignness and difference. 
With this in mind, it becomes more difficult for an audience to view the Syrian – and perhaps, 
even Lucian himself – as wholly “other”. By complicating the assumptions that have prompted 
the charges against him, Lucian begins to build his case.  
 Thus far it is apparent that the text has complicated the issues surrounding the Syrian’s 
trial in several ways: first, by inverting conventions to humorous effect; then, by exposing a gap 
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between the literary imagination of the past and the reality of the present; and finally, by 
showing that marginal elements are already present in a supposedly Greek context. Bearing in 
mind these complications, I will now jump ahead to the point in the text when the “double 
accusation” is finally brought forth. This case is different from the others; a large crowd gathers 
to watch the proceedings, and quite understandably, Hermes remarks, for this case has a source 
of interest: τό τε γὰρ μὴ ἕωλον εἶναι τὴν κρίσιν, ἀλλὰ καινὴν καὶ ξένην χθές, ὥσπερ ἔφης, 
ἐπηγγελμένην (the trial is not old [ἕωλον], but new and strange, having been announced 
yesterday, as you said) (25). His characterization of the case as new and strange (καινὴν καὶ 
ξένην) highlights the Syrian’s presence as both a novelty and a possible cause for suspicion, 
particularly in the choice of the word “ξένην.” The Greek word “ξένος” more accurately means 
“foreign,” not a word we would necessarily expect to appear in that phrase, and so its use here 
reminds us again that the Syrian is an alien as well as a newcomer. But by describing this case as 
μὴ ἕωλον, “not old”, Hermes also emphasizes a break with the rest of the cases, which Zeus 
specifically described using the same word (ἑώλους δίκας) (3). The word “ἕωλος” literally 
means “day old,” “stale,” or “out of date,” and it seems to be a favorite term of Lucian’s; it also 
appears in Somnium and Rhetorum Praeceptor. In Praeceptor the examples of the ancient 
masters are dismissed as “ἕωλα παραδείγματα,” stale paradigms that are too hard to follow 
(Rhet. Pr.9). Given the implications of that phrase in the context of Praeceptor, which I 
examined in the last chapter, I think the word choice here is significant. Literally, of course, 
those cases are out of date because they have been sitting around for so long, but characterizing 
them in this way reminds us again that the time from which they arise has past. There is not even 
a sense of their glorious monumental quality as ancient relics; rather, they are old and musty like 
a stale piece of bread. This displaces any idealized past that we might be tempted to see in the 
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world of Bis Accusatus, but it also suggests that the Syrian has value precisely because he is not 
ἕωλος, even if his strangeness is otherwise threatening. This is another important point to 
consider in how he will make his defense.  
 The first charge against the Syrian is brought by Rhetoric. After a flowery introduction 
that uses a hodgepodge of quotes from Demosthenes’ orations (On the Crown and Olynthiac 3), 
she explains how this foreigner came to be with her. In this her similarity to both the Rhetoric of 
Rhetorum Praeceptor and Paideia of Somnium become apparent. Rhetoric found him as young 
man, still a “barbarian” in speech and appearance, and educated him: βάρβαρον ἔτι τὴν φωνὴν 
καὶ μονονουχὶ κάνδυν ἐνδεδυκότα εἰς τὸν Ἀσσύριον τρόπον, περὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν εὑροῦσα 
πλαζόμενον ἔτι καὶ ὅ τι χρήσαιτο ἑαυτῷ οὐκ εἰδότα παραλαβοῦσα ἐπαίδευσα (finding him 
still a barbarian in speech and wearing nothing but a Median garment in Assyrian style, 
wandering about Ionia, not knowing what was good for him, I took him up and educated him) 
(27). Later, much taken with his admiration and devotion to her, she married him to bring him 
fully into Greek society: εἶτα ἀγαγοῦσα αὐτὸν εἰς τοὺς φυλέτας τοὺς ἐμοὺς παρενέγραψα 
καὶ ἀστὸν ἀπέφηνα (then leading him to my tribe I enrolled him and displayed him as a citizen) 
(27). She thus plays the role for the Syrian of both a guide and teacher, like Paideia, and of a 
wife who transfers social status to her husband, as the other Rhetoric did. This story also invokes 
many of the same elements that were involved in the transformations described in the previous 
two works, including dress, presentation, and speech. The Syrian’s identity as a non-Greek is 
marked by his “barbaric” speech and his Assyrian-style dress (κάνδυν ἐνδεδυκότα εἰς τὸν 
Ἀσσύριον τρόπον). A significant part of what Rhetoric does to change him involves changing 
his dress, presumably to something more civilized (κλεινὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἀοίδιμον ἐποίουν 
κατακοσμοῦσα καὶ περιστέλλουσα) (arranging and dressing him up, I made him famous and 
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sung of) (27). It is also important for her to display him in public (ἀστὸν ἀπέφηνα) to confirm 
his new status in society. Overall this presents a picture consistent with what we have seen about 
what is involved in the transformation of a rhetorical education and how the identity of a 
pepaideumenos is expressed. Moreover, it suggests that we should see the Syrian as almost a 
later version of someone like the speaker in Somnium or the addressee in Praeceptor, who has 
already passed through his process of education.  
 If we read him as such, however, we have to take into account what an analysis of those 
previous works has revealed. In Somnium and Rhetorum Praeceptor, Lucian shows how the 
connection between appearance and identity, for a pepaideumenos, is fraught with complexity, 
and I would suggest that it is no different here. My interpretation is, of course, largely based on 
choosing to read the texts in the order that I have, which does not necessarily bear any relation to 
how they were written or performed. However, I would argue that not only does Bis Accusatus 
invite a connection with the other works, but it also incorporates hints of the same complexities 
in the text itself. I find evidence of this in the two cases that come to trial before the Syrian does: 
the Academy against Drunkenness (Μέθη), over the enslavement of the man Polemo; and Stoa 
against Pleasure, accused of stealing away her lover Dionysus.  
Both cases are themselves rich opportunities for interpretation, particularly regarding how 
they embody competing schools of philosophy, but I am interested specifically in how they relate 
to the final case. In the second of the two, Stoa accuses Pleasure of seducing away her lover 
Dionysus from a temperate, virtuous life to one of careless hedonism; Epicurus speaks on behalf 
of Pleasure, arguing that since pleasure is preferable to pain, this is naturally what men will 
choose, and therefore there is no question of seduction in this case. This trial is essentially a 
debate between Stoicism and Epicureanism; “stoa” (portico) likely refers to the “Stoa Poikile” in 
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which the Stoic philosopher Zeno of Citium taught.  Even on a simple level, however, it presents 
us with a contrast between a life of virtue won by long, hard toil, and one of easy enjoyment, 
again bringing up the motif of a choice of two paths found in Somnium and Praeceptor. Stoa’s 
speech acknowledges that she is not as pretty in appearance as her opponent and that this may be 
a factor in the jurors’ decision:  
οὐκ ἀγνοῶ μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὡς πρὸς εὐπρόσωπόν μοι τὴν ἀντίδικον ὁ 
λόγος ἔσται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ὁρῶ πρὸς μὲν ἐκείνην ἀποβλέποντας 
καὶ μειδιῶντας πρὸς αὐτήν, ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονοῦντας, ὅτι ἐν χρῷ κέκαρμαι καὶ 
ἀρρενωπὸν βλέπω καὶ σκυθρωπὴ δοκῶ  
 I am not unaware, gentlemen of the jury, that the discourse will be in favor of my 
fair opponent, but in fact I see many of you glancing at her and smiling towards her, 
despising me, because I am shaven close to the skin and I appear masculine, and I 
seem sullen-looking (20).  
 
Her implication is that Pleasure’s good looks are only superficial, and she is nevertheless the 
more virtuous choice. This recalls the contrast between Paideia, who was also fair of face 
(εὐπρόσωπόν), and Techne, who was likewise more manly-looking, as well as the difference 
between the effeminate and masculine guides in Praeceptor. Observing this similarity might also 
lead us to recall the motif on which the figures in Somnium were based, the fable of the choice of 
Heracles between Vice and Virtue. In fact, it is likely Lucian wants us to be thinking of that 
reference at this moment, for Stoa later references Heracles: αὐτὴν ἐρωτᾶτε, οἵους ἂν οἴεται 
γενέσθαι τὸν Ἡρακλέα καὶ τὸν ὑμέτερον Θησέα, εἰ προσθέντες τῇ ἡδονῇ ἔφυγον τοὺς 
πόνους (Ask her, what sort of men does she supposed that Heracles and later Theseus would 
have been, if taking up with pleasure they had fled their labors) (20). This reminds us of the 
choice Heracles had to make in Prodicus’ fable between an easy life and a hard one, and aligns 
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the present case with that choice. This suggests that Lucian is reworking the same motif again 
here, if in a subtler way.  
 In the Somnium this motif was inverted because the “right” choice, Paideia, was the one 
with the pretty appearance, while Techne was rejected for her ugliness, which is the opposite of 
how the fable is supposed to work. A similar inversion occurs in this text. Before the defense 
speaks, we probably assume that Stoa is the “right” choice in the sense that the case will be 
decided her in favor, not only because of the moral example she has established for herself, but 
because of how the previous case was decided. Stoa explicitly links her case to the one between 
Academy and Drunkenness: ἥν γε οἱ πρὸ ὑμῶν δίκην ἐδίκασαν τῇ Ἀκαδημείᾳ καὶ τῇ Μέθῃ, 
ἀδελφὴ τῆς παρούσης δίκης ἐστίν (the case which they judged before you regarding Academy 
and Drunkenness, it is the sister of this present case) (20). It makes sense, because the scenario in 
that case also involved a choice between the respectable, industrious life of philosopher, and the 
disreputable, freewheeling life of a drunkard. In that trial, the jury affirmed the former by voting 
in favor of the Academy, but despite Stoa’s bid to associate her case with that verdict, in this one 
Pleasure wins unanimously. Again the “right” and “wrong” sides seem to have been reversed. 
Although this reversal of terms is much less significant to Bis Accusatus overall than the one in 
the Somnium was, it still fits in with the kind of displacement that Lucian is constantly creating 
throughout all of the texts we have examined thus far. The easy road is shown to be preferable 
over the hard; appearance seems to be more important than substance. All of these have the 
effect of challenging the audience’s assumptions about what it means to have paideia. The hints 
presented in these two trials offer a link outwards to those ideas in the other texts and, more 
obliquely, to the source from which they all draw. They then invite us to approach the 
relationship between Rhetoric and the Syrian with these issues in mind.  
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 Thus, the Syrian represents a figure that has successfully made the transformation into a 
pepaideumenos, but with Lucian’s constant reminder that this process is not as simple as it 
seems. It should also remind us that the charge against him may carry more risk than just an 
offended genre: this upstart foreigner stands accused of casting aside the very agent that gave 
him any respectable identity at all. In his defense speech, the Syrian never denies that Rhetoric 
did everything for him that she said she did; however, he argues that Rhetoric, not he, was guilty 
of bad conduct. After he had lived with her for a while, she changed from a respectable 
companion to a shameless tart, dolling herself up to please her hordes of admirers:  
ἐγὼ γὰρ ὁρῶν ταύτην οὐκέτι σωφρονοῦσαν οὐδὲ μένουσαν ἐπὶ τοῦ κοσμίου 
σχήματος οἷόν ποτε ἐσχηματισμένην αὐτὴν ὁ Παιανιεὺς ἐκεῖνος ἠγάγετο, 
κοσμουμένην δὲ καὶ τὰς τρίχας εὐθετίζουσαν εἰς τὸ ἑταιρικὸν καὶ φυκίον 
ἐντριβομένην καὶ τὠφθαλμὼ ὑπογραφομένην, ὑπώπτευον εὐθὺς καὶ 
παρεφύλαττον ὅποι τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν φέρει. 
Seeing that she was no longer chaste and had not remained in modest fashion of the 
sort she had worn when that Paianius [Demosthenes] led her, but was well-arrayed 
and thrice done-up in the manner of a courtesan, and had rubbed in rouge and 
painted under her eyes, I at once became suspicious and guarded where she turned 
her gaze (31).   
 
The Syrian did not want to deal with her in this new state, so he escaped to live with Dialogue, 
who in any case is a much better fit for a man getting on in years, as he is now (32). In other 
words, he seems to be saying, the circumstances surrounding his paideia have changed in a way 
that makes a shift in his path the appropriate course of action. His plea is apparently convincing, 
for he wins all but one of the jurors’ votes. The nature of the Syrian’s defense fits into the larger 
context of the piece and its defense of paideia for essentially the same reason: it implies that the 
practice of rhetoric itself has changed and therefore it may make sense for one practicing it to 
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adjust accordingly. The focus on Rhetoric’s new habit of arranging and beautifying her 
appearance (κοσμουμένην… ὑπογραφομένην) returns to the persistent theme of dress and 
physical appearance, and suggests a logical extension of a kind of paideia that is overly 
concerned with those matters alone. Perhaps more notably, the Syrian suggests that Rhetoric has 
degenerated; she is not like she was in the time of Demosthenes, even though she tried to imitate 
him in the opening lines of her speech. This evokes a gap between past and present reminiscent 
of the one discussed in relation to Rhetorum Praeceptor. Again Lucian reminds us that it is no 
longer possible to truly be like the orators of the classical era, and perhaps a true pepaideumenos 
is one who does not continue to pretend that nothing has changed. He acknowledges a break with 
tradition, but shifts the terms of debate so that his audience will have to reconsider what it really 
means to break with precedent in the way that he has. 
 Lucian continues to develop this method of defense in the second accusation against the 
Syrian, brought by Dialogue, in which he must justify not only having broken with tradition but 
altering it in unusual ways. Dialogue alleges that he was once a serious and solemn art, 
concerned with lofty matters of philosophy, but when the Syrian came to live with him, he 
dragged him down to the level of the masses, mixing him with comedy and other genres until he 
became a ridiculous-looking hybrid, a literary “hippocentaur”: κρᾶσίν τινα παράδοξον 
κέκραμαι καὶ οὔτε πεζός εἰμι οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν μέτρων βέβηκα, ἀλλὰ ἱπποκενταύρου δίκην 
σύνθετόν τι καὶ ξένον φάσμα τοῖς ἀκούουσι δοκῶ (I have been blended into some paradoxical 
mixture and I am neither afoot nor do I ride upon verses, but in the manner of a hippocentaur I 
seem some composite and foreign monster to those listening) (33). For this, the Syrian is guilty 
of serious insult (ὕβρις). These charges return to the problem of strangeness and newness that 
arose when the Syrian’s trial was first announced. Here these qualities have been created by a 
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mash-up of disparate elements, which Dialogue emphasizes with the visual image of the centaur, 
half-man, half-horse, and the mixed metaphor that introduces it. The phrase, οὔτε πεζός εἰμι 
οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν μέτρων βέβηκα, which I translate as “I am neither afoot nor do I ride upon verses” 
in an attempt to capture the metaphor, actually signifies two contrasts: one between walking 
(πεζός, on foot) and riding (βέβηκα) on horseback, which is suitable for the centaur image; and 
the other between prose (an alternate meaning of πεζός) and poetry (τῶν μέτρων, verses). The 
language itself encapsulates the incomprehensibility that the mixing of genres has produced; 
even to describe or categorize it has become problematic. Moreover, the issue of identity is still 
at stake: the Syrian has made Dialogue seem “ξένον” (foreign or strange), the same word used 
earlier in reference to the Syrian himself (καινὴν καὶ ξένην) (25). This meddling with tradition 
is particularly troublesome because the one doing it is himself a strange hybrid, a barbarian who 
speaks Greek, and an outsider who became a member of elite society through his paideia.  
 Despite his problematic position, the Syrian again defends himself not by denying the 
charges but by arguing that his actions were beneficial to Dialogue rather than insulting. 
Dialogue was dull and stuffy, he says, and by taking him down from his lofty perch and sprucing 
him up with bits of comedy, he made him more appealing to people (34). The Syrian’s defense 
speech again sways the jury in his favor, yet his arguments alone do not seem to be sufficient to 
tackle the potential threats of foreignness and paradox that his presence has raised. Moreover, at 
the end of his speech, he asserts:  
τῶν γε ἄλλων ἕνεκα οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι μέμψαιτό μοι, ὡς θοἰμάτιον τοῦτο τὸ 
Ἑλληνικὸν περισπάσας αὐτοῦ βαρβαρικόν τι μετενέδυσα, καὶ ταῦτα βάρβαρος 
αὐτὸς εἶναι δοκῶν. ἠδίκουν γὰρ ἂν τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς αὐτὸν παρανομῶν καὶ τὴν 
πάτριον ἐσθῆτα λωποδυτῶν  
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I don’t suppose he could reproach me on account of the other matters, that I took off 
his Greek clothes and dressed him in some barbarian manner, even though I myself 
seem to be barbarian with respect to those things. I would be unjust to do such 
unlawful things towards him, and steal his native clothes (34).  
The Syrian acknowledges the potential threat of his foreignness that is implicit in the charges 
against him; he knows that he seems foreign himself. Yet he denies that this is a problem here, 
and in fact he would be in the wrong if it was. He frames all of this in terms of clothing and 
appearance, highly charged themes in Lucian’s treatment of paideia. In itself it does not sound 
like a particularly reassuring defense, and possibly contradictory: if the Syrian looks alien 
enough that he must justify his presence, how did he leave Dialogue essentially untouched? Only 
by bringing it together with Lucian’s overarching strategy can we begin to understand how the 
Syrian can spin a charge of tampering with tradition into a noteworthy accomplishment.  
 If for Rhetoric the historical precedent that Lucian alludes to is Demosthenes, with 
Dialogue he is clearly echoing Plato. Dialogue begins his speech with self-effacing language that 
recalls the Apology of Socrates; the rest of his speech is laden with quotes from the Phaedrus 
(246e). Other philosophical schools may have been featured in the earlier cases, but evidently we 
are to picture Plato as the highest standard for philosophical dialogue. The Syrian, then, is 
claiming to have “modernized” Plato in a humorous, appealing manner. Dialogue would argue 
that this amounts to an outlandish travesty of a literary and philosophical ideal, but perhaps, as 
we have seen, things are never quite as simple as they seem. Lucian was clearly well-read in 
Plato and makes frequent references to him in his works, if less so in the ones that this paper 
focuses on.
45
 R. Bracht Branham has argued that there are, in fact, important precedents for 
Lucian’s comic dialogues in Plato’s own dialogues, and that Lucian uses similar techniques and 
concepts to achieve his own ends. Branham gives the example of the Euthydemus, in which Plato 
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uses a satirical representation of sophists to contrast them with Socratic discourse, by 
highlighting a gap between the sophists’ artificial use of language and the reality it describes.46 
Branham argues that Lucian employs a similar strategy in dialogues, such as Anacharsis, that 
bring together wildly disparate characters from myth and history. These encounters are 
humorous because of a language gap, not between an ideal and representations of its opponents, 
but between two characters who cannot correctly interpret what the other is talking about.
47
 The 
point is that all of these characters are available to Lucian in the literary and mythic context from 
which he draws; likewise, the full range of philosophical schools, literary genres, and schools of 
thought that are given voice and represented by these characters is also available to an author in 
the Second Sophistic.
48
 By humorously juxtaposing them, Lucian forces his audience to view 
these elements of tradition in a different light.  
Although not included in Branham’s analysis, Bis Accusatus, and specifically the 
Syrian’s treatment of Dialogue, which can be seen as a metaphor for Lucian’s own literary 
technique, are relevant here. The Syrian’s new, improved version of philosophical dialogue may 
contain a bizarre mix of comedy and Platonic discourse, but all of these are now part of the 
tradition that has come down to him through paideia, far removed from their original separate 
contexts, and now they can exist side by side. In fact, a blending of genres may be the most 
logical response to this present reality, and a more legitimate engagement with literary tradition. 
The Syrian’s bizarre “hippocentaur” is threatening because it requires his audience to reconsider 
traditional boundaries between genres, but perhaps he is only showing them how strange their 
world really is. He does this, according to Branham’s analysis, by adapting techniques from 
within the tradition of philosophical dialogue that was handed down to him from Plato, to create 
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a new style that fits his present circumstances more suitably that mere imitation would have. 
Despite appearing to be an outsider, he aims to prove himself a legitimate part of the established 
tradition, while at the same time seeking to innovate within that tradition.  
 I think that if we view the defense of the Syrian’s paideia in terms of the tension between 
tradition and innovation, many other aspects of it begin to fall into place. On the one hand, the 
entire idea of paideia depends upon an unbroken connection between a Greek cultural ideal of 
the past and the pepaideumenos who embodies it through conscious imitation. To be a legitimate 
pepaideumenos, the Syrian needs to place himself within that lineage; he admits himself that it 
would be wrong of him to change Greek Dialogue into foreign clothes. However, he is aware, 
and makes his audience aware, that this ideal of paideia does not necessarily coincide with its 
reality. We are no longer in the time of Demosthenes and Plato, and in a new political situation 
the purpose and uses of both rhetoric and philosophy may have changed. We are also reminded 
that what has come to encompass paideia is a “disconcerting babel of incompatible traditions” to 
which any author of the present time has access, and therefore a claim to a pure, unbroken 
tradition is more difficult to make.
49
 In response to these circumstances, the Syrian seems to 
suggest, it is better not to try to merely imitate the ἕωλα παραδείγματα, stale examples, of the 
old masters, but to do something μὴ ἕωλον, by following these examples to create one’s own 
original inventions that aim to be as good as those that came before them; this is, essentially, a 
more authentic kind of imitation. It is by virtue of his innovation that he merits a place within the 
tradition. 
 This conception of the author’s role as an innovator of tradition also offers a slightly 
different angle with which to interpret the Syrian’s role as an outsider. Since it has such a central 
                                                 
49
 Branham 1989, 82.  
68 
 
presence in the piece, and especially given that the Syrian himself acknowledges his foreign 
appearance, it seems likely that the audience is supposed to picture this character as someone 
who despite his Greek paideia still appears different, whether in some accent of speech or 
peculiarity of appearance. The Syrian is either unable or unwilling to fully assimilate. And 
because we have linked Lucian as an author to this persona, it seems reasonable to speculate that 
Lucian also appeared foreign in a similar way, and therefore needed to defend his position in 
Greek society through the representation of this trial. I would like to suggest, however, that the 
emphasis on the outsider has additional significance as a rhetorical construction that interplays 
with the figure of the innovator. Part of this construction relates back to the character of Pan, 
who, as I explain above, is used to set up our expectations of the Syrian. As an outsider living so 
near the center, Pan proves to have a unique perspective on the insiders around him. When he 
converses with Hermes and Justice, they address the topic of the many philosophers who are now 
wandering around Athens sporting characteristic beards and cloaks. Although he confesses 
himself an uneducated observer, Pan is critical of these so-called philosophers, most of which 
seem to do little more than see who can shout the loudest:  
διαταράξαντες γοῦν τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπισκοπούμενον συγχέαντες 
ἀπίασι λοιδορησάμενοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ πολλοί, τὸν ἱδρῶτα ἐκ τοῦ μετώπου ἀγκύλῳ 
τῷ δακτύλῳ ἀποξυόμενοι, καὶ οὗτος κρατεῖν ἔδοξεν ὃς ἂν μεγαλοφωνότερος 
αὐτῶν ᾖ  
Mixing up their discourses and jumbling from the start the matter that has been 
considered, many of them go about abusing one another, wiping sweating from their 
foreheads with a bent finger, and the one who is the loudest of voice seems to win 
out (11).  
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The absurdity of all these people claiming to be philosophers is evident to Pan precisely because 
he lacks any context for understanding them: it all just sounds like shouting to him. By viewing 
the situation through his eyes we are also encouraged to see it as absurd. The outsider thus has a 
clearer perspective on how things really are. I think that once we have seen Pan presented as 
having this insight because of his position, we are encouraged to see the Syrian as an outsider 
whose unique position also allows him a more accurate perspective on the reality of his time and 
place. The audience is forced to consider that there might be some advantage in being foreign.  
 If his status as an outsider is what allows the Syrian to observe the gap between past and 
present that Bis Accusatus has exposed for its audience, it may also be what led him to choose to 
engage with paideia through his peculiar balance of innovation and tradition. If he appears 
foreign in some obvious way, perhaps he can never truly gain acceptance by pretending to be a 
Greek orator or philosopher, and therefore it is better to position himself as a figure who is linked 
to tradition in a different way. In either case he will seem strange to a Greek audience, but this 
way he has more control over how that strangeness is expressed. Or to approach from a different 
angle, perhaps there are advantages to representing oneself as an outsider if you happen to be 
producing literary works that your audiences find unusual and shocking. If we align the Syrian 
with Lucian as an author, this shows how Lucian is brilliantly playing his self-representation as 
both foreigner and innovator to his own advantage. Ethnicity codes his innovation, and vice 
versa. It is not that Lucian was necessarily compelled to develop his own literary style because 
he was an outsider, or that he merely chose to represent himself as an outsider in order to 
innovate; rather, both of those possibilities are reflected in Bis Accusatus in a way that makes 
aspects of Lucian’s self-representation that could be very threatening instead lead to his acquittal.  
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 If the audience is attuned to the many clever twists of Lucian’s piece, by the end of Bis 
Accusatus they should be disposed to agree with the Syrian’s defense, if only because he has 
made any further arguments against him difficult to maintain. One final element of the Syrian’s 
last speech remains to be addressed. As I already noted, the Syrian frames his transformation of 
Dialogue in terms of changing clothes, which was symbolic of changing ethnic identity: οὐκ ἂν 
οἶμαι μέμψαιτό μοι, ὡς θοἰμάτιον τοῦτο τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν περισπάσας αὐτοῦ βαρβαρικόν τι 
μετενέδυσα (I don’t suppose he could reproach me, that I took off his Greek clothes and dressed 
him in some barbarian manner) (34). This is a curious metaphor to use, for although ethnicity is 
frequently marked by clothing, clothes in themselves do not determine ethnicity: a superficial 
metaphor for an inherent identity. It does, however, recall the other places in this text, as well as 
in the other works I have examined, when a change in or pronouncement of identity is marked by 
a change of appearance. The speaker of the Somnium put on purple clothing to become a 
pepaideumenos; the effeminate guide in Rhetorum Praeceptor advised his pupil on what to wear 
in order to look like an orator. In both cases the superficiality of clothing was an indication of 
how these identities were or might be pretended.  
  As the Syrian’s metaphor suggests, however, clothing in Bis Accusatus seems to have a 
less straightforward set of associations. On the one hand, there are places in the text where the 
disjunction between appearance and inner identity are clearly important. All the false 
philosophers running about Athens that so irritate Pan are said to have a characteristic costume 
of a threadbare cloak, staff, and leather wallet (τρίβωνες καὶ βακτηρίαι καὶ πῆραι)(6), yet the 
gods acknowledge that many who wear these clothes do not actually live up to the name of 
philosopher (7). On the other hand, both the decline of Rhetoric and the Syrian’s transformation 
of Dialogue are framed in terms of changes in appearance which are clearly meant to reflect a 
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real change in character. Rhetoric, as noted above, began dressing up and putting on make-up 
(31), changes which, although they indicate her new interest in more superficial matters, are 
nevertheless presumably aligned with what she really has become. The Syrian also explains how 
he took Dialogue, who still seemed sullen-looking to most people (σκυθρωπὸν ἔτι τοῖς πολλοῖς 
δοκοῦντα), and made him more pleasing to audiences by washing away his squalor (τὸν αὐχμὸν 
τὸν πολὺν ἀποπλύνας) and putting a smile on his face (μειδιᾶν καταναγκάσας) (34). This too 
is a superficial change, but it is integrated with real alterations to his style and content, and is 
presented as a positive part of the Syrian’s defense. Both of these examples suggest that perhaps 
there are times when a change in clothing does correspond to a legitimate change in identity. Yet 
how are we to know when this is true and when it is not? 
 I think that, as is often the case with Lucian’s texts, the ambiguity is the point. Clothing is 
allowed to have different meanings as it suits the author’s purpose for each scenario, and both 
functions come together in his defense. If clothes are only superficial, then linking them to 
ethnicity is a way of minimizing how threatening the Syrian’s ethnicity seems: he may look 
foreign, but only on the outside; inside he is a true pepaideumenos. Conversely, if clothing is an 
authentic identity marker, then by associating it with paideia the author is able to legitimize his 
status as pepaideumenos. The Syrian may be a foreigner, but as he reassures us in his final 
speech, “his outlandish dialogues are clothed in native Greek attire.”50 What is fraudulent in one 
context becomes a conveniently visible signifier in another, but either way the effect is the same, 
because Lucian is able to play both possibilities to his advantage. If his audience is perplexed by 
these tricks of multiple meanings, so much the better, for it allows the author to maintain the 
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upper hand. Perhaps paideia is nothing more than a purple-bordered robe, but it is one that 





















 Paideia is an important theme in Somnium, Rhetorum Praeceptor, and Bis Accusatus, and 
all three works explore different facets of it which do not necessarily lead to the same 
conclusion. Even within each piece, Lucian plays with contradictory ideas and shifting points of 
reference in ways that are often bewildering for his reader. The logical progression of the three 
texts takes us through the career of a pepaideumenos from the moment he chooses to pursue 
paideia, as he takes the steps (literally and figuratively) towards mastery of rhetoric, to finally 
later his career when the fruits of his work are put on trial. Somnium crafts a satire of paideia that 
manages also to be a brilliant display of the author’s own paideia. Rhetorum Praeceptor is also a 
satire that turns in on itself as it exposes the performative nature of oratory and the gap between 
past and present that paideia attempts to bridge. Bis Accusatus constructs a defense for an 
outsider and newcomer that both disrupts and upholds the traditional nature of paideia. All three 
works rely on challenging or displacing assumptions of an internal or external audience about 
paideia and those who profess to have it. None of them offers a single, definitive assertion of 
what the role of paideia is or should be, and indeed more often there seem to be multiple layers 
of meaning within one text. This suggests a constant give and take between Lucian and his 
surroundings that is reflected in the composition and performance of his works.  
 One motif that all of these texts do have in common is clothing and its relationship to 
identity, particularly the identity created by paideia. This persistent connection between clothing 
and paideia is also persistently problematic in various ways. In Somnium clothing was one of the 
ornamenting assets offered by Paideia, and the speaker changed into new, fancy clothes when he 
became a pepaideumenos. This raised the troubling possibility that paideia might signify only 
superficial outward adornment. However, this suggestion ultimately proved to be contained 
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within the author’s mastery of paideia and its implications in a society where the status of 
pepaideumenos was marked by self-presentation. Clothing in Rhetorum Praeceptor also 
symbolized an attention to outward appearance at the detriment of substance, when it invited the 
audience to laugh at the effeminate guide who imagined that fancy clothes and a purple stripe on 
his cloak would make him appear an orator. But this too became complicated throughout the text 
as it was revealed that the superficiality and the imitative quality of the “false” orator were 
problematic for the “real” one also. Bis Accusatus, on the other hand, incorporated examples of 
clothing as both a false and authentic marker of identity in ways that worked in favor of the 
author’s representation of his persona. By emphasizing a connection between clothes and 
ethnicity, he minimizes his ethnicity; by making that same connection with paideia, he 
simultaneously legitimizes his paideia.    
In each text the question of whether or not clothing should be taken as a mark of 
authentic identity remains ambiguous at best. More often Lucian seems to be playing with both 
sides, simultaneously proposing clothes can be a cover for a fraudulent identity and the sign of a 
real one. I think that through this he is suggesting that paideia is like a costume that allows 
someone to play a certain role. That role may or may not be a “real” identity, but for the purpose 
of performance this is beside the point. Lucian takes advantage of the costume-like nature of 
paideia by playing many different roles throughout his texts, refusing to be trapped in any one 
voice or guise. If those roles sometimes seem contradictory or irreconcilable, that is not his 
concern, as long as the performance suits his purpose in a particular situation. He can suggest, on 
the one hand, that paideia is a superficial identity marked by outward display, or that the past is 
impossibly separated from the present; yet at the same time, he is still able to utilize paideia and 
its canon to legitimize his literary creations. I think that there are points at which Lucian wants 
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his audience to be aware that they are seeing a mask and to grapple, as I have done here, with 
questions of authenticity and representation. Ultimately, however, the key point is that Lucian 
proves himself capable of the performance of paideia, and it is in this performance that 
authenticity, or at least legitimization, lies. In other words, the question is not really whether or 
not he, or anyone else, truly is as he appears to be, but how skillfully he plays the role that he has 
chosen, and Lucian clearly shows that he is a master of role-playing.  
 Finally, there is one question prompted by all three texts which should be addressed, even 
though it is no more easily answered. To what extent does paideia enable social mobility? At the 
end of the first chapter, I noted that Somnium had raised this issue because of its depiction of a 
youth rising from relatively modest means to a lofty status. Although this piece suggests that this 
is indeed possible, it was difficult to determine what the nature of such a transformation might 
be, because the terms by which we would interpret it had been made problematic through the 
satirizing of paideia. Rhetorum Praeceptor also implies that paideia confers a change of social 
status: once he has completed his journey and married Rhetoric, the aspiring youth will gain not 
only fame but material wealth from his union. However, in this piece also the focus is shifted 
from the actual result of this process to the ways in which it can be vulnerable to de-
legitimization. We are not so sure, in the end, if Rhetoric’s dowry is worth having or not. And 
although the ultimate defense of Bis Accusatus rests upon the assumption that a foreign nobody 
can become a pepaideumenos, simply the fact that this defense should be thought necessary 
raises a hint of doubt about the effectiveness of such a transformation.  
 In all three works there is a pattern by which this issue is raised but then elided by or 
merged with other concerns. Perhaps this suggests that while paideia does create social mobility, 
it is always fraught with complication and open to suspicion. However, I think it may be more 
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likely that, like the concern over the authenticity of clothing, this question too is misplaced. That 
is, although Lucian is aware that paideia has such power, and indeed relies on the fact that it 
does, it is not what he chooses to emphasize. Instead he focuses on paideia as a performance, 
placing the changing of social position within the framework of changing performance roles. In 
that context any transformation is possible if the performer has the means to construct it, as 
Lucian manages to do for his own personas in these texts. I think that Lucian is less concerned 
with whether paideia in general might allow someone to rise from a marginalized position to a 
lofty one, than whether he is able to represent himself as having done so successfully.  
In this, as always, Lucian manages to get the last laugh, for his texts themselves are proof 
that this representation has been successful. If in his own time he was an outsider who needed to 
defend his paideia, as he would have us believe, he now merits a place in the modern definition 
of “classical” literature. As Paideia asserts in Somnium: ἢν αὐτὸς ἐκ τοῦ βίου ἀπέλθῃς, οὔποτε 
παύσῃ συνὼν τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις; even if you yourself depart from life, you never cease to be 
among the pepaideumenoi (12). Like the narrator through whom he speaks in that piece, Lucian 
gained a voice by his paideia, and it is a voice that we can still hear. In this he has never ceased 
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